Whether the Parts of Temperance Are Rightly Assigned?
Objection 1: It would seem that Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54)
unbecomingly assigns the parts of temperance, when he asserts them to
be "continence, mildness, and modesty." For continence is reckoned to
be distinct from virtue (Ethic. vii, 1): whereas temperance is
comprised under virtue. Therefore continence is not a part of
temperance.
Obj. 2: Further, mildness seemingly softens hatred or anger. But
temperance is not about these things, but about pleasures of touch,
as stated above (Q. 141, A. 4). Therefore mildness is not a part of
temperance.
Obj. 3: Further, modesty concerns external action, wherefore the
Apostle says (Phil. 4:5): "Let your modesty be known to all men." Now
external actions are the matter of justice, as stated above (Q. 58,
A. 8). Therefore modesty is a part of justice rather than of
temperance.
Obj. 4: Further, Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons many more
parts of temperance: for he says that "temperance results in modesty,
shamefacedness, abstinence, chastity, honesty, moderation, lowliness,
sobriety, purity." Andronicus also says [*De Affectibus] that "the
companions of temperance are gravity, continence, humility,
simplicity, refinement, method, contentment." [*_Per-se-sufficientiam_
which could be rendered "self-sufficiency," but for the fact that
this is taken in a bad sense. See Q. 169, A. 1.] Therefore it seems
that Tully insufficiently reckoned the parts of temperance.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (QQ. 48, 128), a cardinal virtue may
have three kinds of parts, namely integral, subjective, and
potential. The integral parts of a virtue are the conditions the
concurrence of which are necessary for virtue: and in this respect
there are two integral parts of temperance, _shamefacedness,_ whereby
one recoils from the disgrace that is contrary to temperance, and
_honesty,_ whereby one loves the beauty of temperance. For, as stated
above (Q. 141, A. 2, ad 3), temperance more than any other virtue
lays claim to a certain comeliness, and the vices of intemperance
excel others in disgrace.
The subjective parts of a virtue are its species: and the species of
a virtue have to be differentiated according to the difference of
matter or object. Now temperance is about pleasures of touch, which
are of two kinds. For some are directed to nourishment: and in these
as regards meat, there is _abstinence,_ and as regards drink properly
there is _sobriety._ Other pleasures are directed to the power of
procreation, and in these as regards the principal pleasure of the
act itself of procreation, there is _chastity,_ and as to the
pleasures incidental to the act, resulting, for instance, from
kissing, touching, or fondling, we have _purity._
The potential parts of a principal virtue are called secondary
virtues: for while the principal virtue observes the mode in some
principal matter, these observe the mode in some other matter wherein
moderation is not so difficult. Now it belongs to temperance to
moderate pleasures of touch, which are most difficult to moderate.
Wherefore any virtue that is effective of moderation in some matter
or other, and restrains the appetite in its impulse towards
something, may be reckoned a part of temperance, as a virtue annexed
thereto.
This happens in three ways: first, in the inward movements of the
soul; secondly, in the outward movements and actions of the body;
thirdly, in outward things. Now besides the movement of
concupiscence, which temperance moderates and restrains, we find in
the soul three movements towards a particular object. In the first
place there is the movement of the will when stirred by the impulse
of passion: and this movement is restrained by _continence,_ the
effect of which is that, although a man suffer immoderate
concupiscences, his will does not succumb to them. Another inward
movement towards something is the movement of hope, and of the
resultant daring, and this is moderated or restrained by _humility._
The third movement is that of anger, which tends towards revenge, and
this is restrained by _meekness_ or _mildness._
With regard to bodily movements and actions, moderation and restraint
is the effect of _modesty,_ which, according to Andronicus, has three
parts. The first of these enables one to discern what to do and what
not to do, and to observe the right order, and to persevere in what
we do: this he assigns to _method._ The second is that a man observe
decorum in what he does, and this he ascribes to _refinement._ The
third has to do with the conversation or any other intercourse
between a man and his friends, and this is called _gravity._
With regard to external things, a twofold moderation has to be
observed. First, we must not desire too many, and to this Macrobius
assigns _lowliness,_ and Andronicus _contentment_; secondly, we must
not be too nice in our requirements, and to this Macrobius ascribes
_moderation,_ Andronicus _simplicity._
Reply Obj. 1: It is true that continence differs from virtue, just as
imperfect differs from perfect, as we shall state further on (Q. 165,
A. 1); and in this sense it is condivided with virtue. Yet it has
something in common with temperance both as to matter, since it is
about pleasures of touch, and as to mode, since it is a kind of
restraint. Hence it is suitably assigned as a part of temperance.
Reply Obj. 2: Mildness or meekness is reckoned a part of temperance
not because of a likeness of matter, but because they agree as to the
mode of restraint and moderation as stated above.
Reply Obj. 3: In the matter of external action justice considers what
is due to another. Modesty does not consider this, but only a certain
moderation. Hence it is reckoned a part not of justice but of
temperance.
Reply Obj. 4: Under modesty Tully includes whatever pertains to the
moderation of bodily movements and external things, as well as the
moderation of hope which we reckoned as pertaining to humility.
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