Whether Temperance Is Only About Desires and Pleasures of Touch?
Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires
and pleasures of touch. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xix) that
"the function of temperance is to control and quell the desires which
draw us to the things which withdraw us from the laws of God and from
the fruit of His goodness"; and a little further on he adds that "it
is the duty of temperance to spurn all bodily allurements and popular
praise." Now we are withdrawn from God's laws not only by the desire
for pleasures of touch, but also by the desire for pleasures of the
other senses, for these, too, belong to the bodily allurements, and
again by the desire for riches or for worldly glory: wherefore it is
written (1 Tim. 6:10). "Desire [*_Cupiditas,_ which the Douay version
following the Greek _philargyria_ renders 'desire of money'] is the
root of all evils." Therefore temperance is not only about desires of
pleasures of touch.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "one who is
worthy of small things and deems himself worthy of them is temperate,
but he is not magnificent." Now honors, whether small or great, of
which he is speaking there, are an object of pleasure, not of touch,
but in the soul's apprehension. Therefore temperance is not only
about desires for pleasures of touch.
Obj. 3: Further, things that are of the same genus would seem to
pertain to the matter of a particular virtue under one same aspect.
Now all pleasures of sense are apparently of the same genus.
Therefore they all equally belong to the matter of temperance.
Obj. 4: Further, spiritual pleasures are greater than the pleasures
of the body, as stated above (I-II, Q. 31, A. 5) in the treatise on
the passions. Now sometimes men forsake God's laws and the state of
virtue through desire for spiritual pleasures, for instance, through
curiosity in matters of knowledge: wherefore the devil promised man
knowledge, saying (Gen. 3:5): "Ye shall be as Gods, knowing good and
evil." Therefore temperance is not only about pleasures of touch.
Obj. 5: Further, if pleasures of touch were the proper matter of
temperance, it would follow that temperance is about all pleasures of
touch. But it is not about all, for instance, about those which occur
in games. Therefore pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of
temperance.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that
"temperance is properly about desires of pleasures of touch."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), temperance is about desires
and pleasures in the same way as fortitude is about fear and daring.
Now fortitude is about fear and daring with respect to the greatest
evils whereby nature itself is dissolved; and such are dangers of
death. Wherefore in like manner temperance must needs be about
desires for the greatest pleasures. And since pleasure results from a
natural operation, it is so much the greater according as it results
from a more natural operation. Now to animals the most natural
operations are those which preserve the nature of the individual by
means of meat and drink, and the nature of the species by the union
of the sexes. Hence temperance is properly about pleasures of meat
and drink and sexual pleasures. Now these pleasures result from the
sense of touch. Wherefore it follows that temperance is about
pleasures of touch.
Reply Obj. 1: In the passage quoted Augustine apparently takes
temperance, not as a special virtue having a determinate matter, but
as concerned with the moderation of reason, in any matter whatever:
and this is a general condition of every virtue. However, we may also
reply that if a man can control the greatest pleasures, much more can
he control lesser ones. Wherefore it belongs chiefly and properly to
temperance to moderate desires and pleasures of touch, and
secondarily other pleasures.
Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher takes temperance as denoting moderation
in external things, when, to wit, a man tends to that which is
proportionate to him, but not as denoting moderation in the soul's
emotions, which pertains to the virtue of temperance.
Reply Obj. 3: The pleasures of the other senses play a different part
in man and in other animals. For in other animals pleasures do not
result from the other senses save in relation to sensibles of touch:
thus the lion is pleased to see the stag, or to hear its voice, in
relation to his food. On the other hand man derives pleasure from the
other senses, not only for this reason, but also on account of the
becomingness of the sensible object. Wherefore temperance is about
the pleasures of the other senses, in relation to pleasures of touch,
not principally but consequently: while in so far as the sensible
objects of the other senses are pleasant on account of their
becomingness, as when a man is pleased at a well-harmonized sound,
this pleasure has nothing to do with the preservation of nature.
Hence these passions are not of such importance that temperance can
be referred to them antonomastically.
Reply Obj. 4: Although spiritual pleasures are by their nature
greater than bodily pleasures, they are not so perceptible to the
senses, and consequently they do not so strongly affect the sensitive
appetite, against whose impulse the good of reason is safeguarded by
moral virtue. We may also reply that spiritual pleasures, strictly
speaking, are in accordance with reason, wherefore they need no
control, save accidentally, in so far as one spiritual pleasure is a
hindrance to another greater and more binding.
Reply Obj. 5: Not all pleasures of touch regard the preservation of
nature, and consequently it does not follow that temperance is about
all pleasures of touch.
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