Whether Perseverance Is a Virtue?
Objection 1: It seems that perseverance is not a virtue. For,
according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), continency is greater
than perseverance. But continency is not a virtue, as stated in
_Ethic._ iv, 9. Therefore perseverance is not a virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, "by virtue man lives aright," according to Augustine
(De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Now according to the same authority (De
Persever. i), no one can be said to have perseverance while living,
unless he persevere until death. Therefore perseverance is not a
virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, it is requisite of every virtue that one should
persist unchangeably in the work of that virtue, as stated in
_Ethic._ ii, 4. But this is what we understand by perseverance: for
Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "perseverance is the fixed and
continued persistence in a well-considered purpose." Therefore
perseverance is not a special virtue, but a condition of every virtue.
_On the contrary,_ Andronicus [*Chrysippus: in De Affect.] says that
"perseverance is a habit regarding things to which we ought to stand,
and those to which we ought not to stand, as well as those that are
indifferent." Now a habit that directs us to do something well, or to
omit something, is a virtue. Therefore perseverance is a virtue.
_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3), "virtue
is about the difficult and the good"; and so where there is a special
kind of difficulty or goodness, there is a special virtue. Now a
virtuous deed may involve goodness or difficulty on two counts.
First, from the act's very species, which is considered in respect of
the proper object of that act: secondly, from the length of time,
since to persist long in something difficult involves a special
difficulty. Hence to persist long in something good until it is
accomplished belongs to a special virtue.
Accordingly just as temperance and fortitude are special virtues, for
the reason that the one moderates pleasures of touch (which is of
itself a difficult thing), while the other moderates fear and daring
in connection with dangers of death (which also is something
difficult in itself), so perseverance is a special virtue, since it
consists in enduring delays in the above or other virtuous deeds, so
far as necessity requires.
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is taking perseverance there, as it is
found in one who bears those things which are most difficult to
endure long. Now it is difficult to endure, not good, but evil. And
evils that involve danger of death, for the most part are not endured
for a long time, because often they soon pass away: wherefore it is
not on this account that perseverance has its chief title to praise.
Among other evils foremost are those which are opposed to pleasures
of touch, because evils of this kind affect the necessaries of life:
such are the lack of food and the like, which at times call for long
endurance. Now it is not difficult to endure these things for a long
time for one who grieves not much at them, nor delights much in the
contrary goods; as in the case of the temperate man, in whom these
passions are not violent. But they are most difficult to bear for one
who is strongly affected by such things, through lacking the perfect
virtue that moderates these passions. Wherefore if perseverance be
taken in this sense it is not a perfect virtue, but something
imperfect in the genus of virtue. On the other hand, if we take
perseverance as denoting long persistence in any kind of difficult
good, it is consistent in one who has even perfect virtue: for even
if it is less difficult for him to persist, yet he persists in the
more perfect good. Wherefore such like perseverance may be a virtue,
because virtue derives perfection from the aspect of good rather than
from the aspect of difficulty.
Reply Obj. 2: Sometimes a virtue and its act go by the same name:
thus Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. lxxix): "Faith is to believe
without seeing." Yet it is possible to have a habit of virtue without
performing the act: thus a poor man has the habit of magnificence
without exercising the act. Sometimes, however, a person who has the
habit, begins to perform the act, yet does not accomplish it, for
instance a builder begins to build a house, but does not complete it.
Accordingly we must reply that the term "perseverance" is sometimes
used to denote the habit whereby one chooses to persevere, sometimes
for the act of persevering: and sometimes one who has the habit of
perseverance chooses to persevere and begins to carry out his choice
by persisting for a time, yet completes not the act, through not
persisting to the end. Now the end is twofold: one is the end of the
work, the other is the end of human life. Properly speaking it
belongs to perseverance to persevere to the end of the virtuous work,
for instance that a soldier persevere to the end of the fight, and
the magnificent man until his work be accomplished. There are,
however, some virtues whose acts must endure throughout the whole of
life, such as faith, hope, and charity, since they regard the last
end of the entire life of man. Wherefore as regards these which are
the principal virtues, the act of perseverance is not accomplished
until the end of life. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of
perseverance as denoting the consummate act of perseverance.
Reply Obj. 3: Unchangeable persistence may belong to a virtue in two
ways. First, on account of the intended end that is proper to that
virtue; and thus to persist in good for a long time until the end,
belongs to a special virtue called perseverance, which intends this
as its special end. Secondly, by reason of the relation of the habit
to its subject: and thus unchangeable persistence is consequent upon
every virtue, inasmuch as virtue is a "quality difficult to change."
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