Whether the Matter of Magnificence Is Great Expenditure?
Objection 1: It seems that the matter of magnificence is not great
expenditure. For there are not two virtues about the same matter. But
liberality is about expenditure, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 2).
Therefore magnificence is not about expenditure.
Obj. 2: Further, "every magnificent man is liberal" (Ethic. iv, 2).
But liberality is about gifts rather than about expenditure.
Therefore magnificence also is not chiefly about expenditure, but
about gifts.
Obj. 3: Further, it belongs to magnificence to produce an external
work. But not even great expenditure is always the means of producing
an external work, for instance when one spends much in sending
presents. Therefore expenditure is not the proper matter of
magnificence.
Obj. 4: Further, only the rich are capable of great expenditure. But
the poor are able to possess all the virtues, since "the virtues do
not necessarily require external fortune, but are sufficient for
themselves," as Seneca says (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi). Therefore
magnificence is not about great expenditure.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that
"magnificence does not extend, like liberality, to all transactions
in money, but only to expensive ones, wherein it exceeds liberality
in scale." Therefore it is only about great expenditure.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), it belongs to magnificence
to intend doing some great work. Now for the doing of a great work,
proportionate expenditure is necessary, for great works cannot be
produced without great expenditure. Hence it belongs to magnificence
to spend much in order that some great work may be accomplished in
becoming manner. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that
"a magnificent man will produce a more magnificent work with equal,"
i.e. proportionate, "expenditure." Now expenditure is the outlay of a
sum of money; and a man may be hindered from making that outlay if he
love money too much. Hence the matter of magnificence may be said to
be both this expenditure itself, which the magnificent man uses to
produce a great work, and also the very money which he employs in
going to great expense, and as well as the love of money, which love
the magnificent man moderates, lest he be hindered from spending much.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 129, A. 2), those virtues that are
about external things experience a certain difficulty arising from
the genus itself of the thing about which the virtue is concerned,
and another difficulty besides arising from the greatness of that
same thing. Hence the need for two virtues, concerned about money and
its use; namely, liberality, which regards the use of money in
general, and magnificence, which regards that which is great in the
use of money.
Reply Obj. 2: The use of money regards the liberal man in one way and
the magnificent man in another. For it regards the liberal man,
inasmuch as it proceeds from an ordinate affection in respect of
money; wherefore all due use of money (such as gifts and
expenditure), the obstacles to which are removed by a moderate love
of money, belongs to liberality. But the use of money regards the
magnificent man in relation to some great work which has to be
produced, and this use is impossible without expenditure or outlay.
Reply Obj. 3: The magnificent man also makes gifts of presents, as
stated in _Ethic._ iv, 2, but not under the aspect of gift, but
rather under the aspect of expenditure directed to the production of
some work, for instance in order to honor someone, or in order to do
something which will reflect honor on the whole state: as when he
brings to effect what the whole state is striving for.
Reply Obj. 4: The chief act of virtue is the inward choice, and a
virtue may have this without outward fortune: so that even a poor man
may be magnificent. But goods of fortune are requisite as instruments
to the external acts of virtue: and in this way a poor man cannot
accomplish the outward act of magnificence in things that are great
simply. Perhaps, however, he may be able to do so in things that are
great by comparison to some particular work; which, though little in
itself, can nevertheless be done magnificently in proportion to its
genus: for little and great are relative terms, as the Philosopher
says (De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.).
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