Whether the Parts of Fortitude Are Suitably Assigned?
Objection 1: It seems that the parts of fortitude are unsuitably
assigned. For Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) assigns four parts to
fortitude, namely _magnificence, confidence, patience,_ and
_perseverance._ Now magnificence seems to pertain to liberality;
since both are concerned about money, and "a magnificent man must
needs be liberal," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 2). But
liberality is a part of justice, as stated above (Q. 117, A. 5).
Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.
Obj. 2: Further, confidence is apparently the same as hope. But hope
does not seem to pertain to fortitude, but is rather a virtue by
itself. Therefore confidence should not be reckoned a part of
fortitude.
Obj. 3: Further, fortitude makes a man behave aright in face of
danger. But magnificence and confidence do not essentially imply any
relation to danger. Therefore they are not suitably reckoned as parts
of fortitude.
Obj. 4: Further, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) patience
denotes endurance of hardships, and he ascribes the same to
fortitude. Therefore patience is the same as fortitude and not a part
thereof.
Obj. 5: Further, that which is a requisite to every virtue should not
be reckoned a part of a special virtue. But perseverance is required
in every virtue: for it is written (Matt. 24:13): "He that shall
persevere to the end he shall be saved." Therefore perseverance
should not be accounted a part of fortitude.
Obj. 6: Further, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) reckons seven parts of
fortitude, namely "magnanimity, confidence, security, magnificence,
constancy, forbearance, stability." Andronicus also reckons seven
virtues annexed to fortitude, and these are, "courage, strength of
will, magnanimity, manliness, perseverance, magnificence." Therefore
it seems that Tully's reckoning of the parts of fortitude is
incomplete.
Obj. 7: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. iii) reckons five parts of
fortitude. The first is _civic_ fortitude, which produces brave deeds
through fear of dishonor or punishment; the second is _military_
fortitude, which produces brave deeds as a result of warlike art or
experience; the third is the fortitude which produces brave deeds
resulting from passion, especially anger; the fourth is the fortitude
which makes a man act bravely through being accustomed to overcome;
the fifth is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely through
being unaccustomed to danger. Now these kinds of fortitude are not
comprised under any of the above enumerations. Therefore these
enumerations of the parts of fortitude are unfitting.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 48), a virtue can have three
kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. But fortitude,
taken as a special virtue, cannot have subjective parts, since it is
not divided into several specifically distinct virtues, for it is
about a very special matter.
However, there are quasi-integral and potential parts assigned to it:
integral parts, with regard to those things the concurrence of which
is requisite for an act of fortitude; and potential parts, because
what fortitude practices in face of the greatest hardships, namely
dangers of death, certain other virtues practice in the matter of
certain minor hardships and these virtues are annexed to fortitude as
secondary virtues to the principal virtue. As stated above (Q. 123,
AA. 3, 6), the act of fortitude is twofold, aggression and endurance.
Now two things are required for the act of aggression. The first
regards preparation of the mind, and consists in one's having a mind
ready for aggression. In this respect Tully mentions _confidence,_ of
which he says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "with this the mind is much
assured and firmly hopeful in great and honorable undertakings." The
second regards the accomplishment of the deed, and consists in not
failing to accomplish what one has confidently begun. In this respect
Tully mentions _magnificence,_ which he describes as being "the
discussion and administration," i.e. accomplishment "of great and
lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind,"
so as to combine execution with greatness of purpose. Accordingly if
these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to
dangers of death, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof, because
without them there can be no fortitude; whereas if they be referred
to other matters involving less hardship, they will be virtues
specifically distinct from fortitude, but annexed thereto as
secondary virtues to principal: thus _magnificence_ is referred by
the Philosopher (Ethic. iv) to great expenses, and _magnanimity,_
which seems to be the same as confidence, to great honors. Again, two
things are requisite for the other act of fortitude, viz. endurance.
The first is that the mind be not broken by sorrow, and fall away
from its greatness, by reason of the stress of threatening evil. In
this respect he mentions _patience,_ which he describes as "the
voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for
the sake of virtue or profit." The other is that by the prolonged
suffering of hardships man be not wearied so as to lose courage,
according to Heb. 12:3, "That you be not wearied, fainting in your
minds." In this respect he mentions _perseverance,_ which accordingly
he describes as "the fixed and continued persistence in a well
considered purpose." If these two be confined to the proper matter of
fortitude, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof; but if they be
referred to any kind of hardship they will be virtues distinct from
fortitude, yet annexed thereto as secondary to principal.
Reply Obj. 1: Magnificence in the matter of liberality adds a certain
greatness: this is connected with the notion of difficulty which is
the object of the irascible faculty, that is perfected chiefly by
fortitude: and to this virtue, in this respect, it belongs.
Reply Obj. 2: Hope whereby one confides in God is accounted a
theological virtue, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 5; I-II, Q. 62, A. 3).
But by confidence which here is accounted a part of fortitude, man
hopes in himself, yet under God withal.
Reply Obj. 3: To venture on anything great seems to involve danger,
since to fail in such things is very disastrous. Wherefore although
magnificence and confidence are referred to the accomplishment of or
venturing on any other great things, they have a certain connection
with fortitude by reason of the imminent danger.
Reply Obj. 4: Patience endures not only dangers of death, with which
fortitude is concerned, without excessive sorrow, but also any other
hardships or dangers. In this respect it is accounted a virtue
annexed to fortitude: but as referred to dangers of death, it is an
integral part thereof.
Reply Obj. 5: Perseverance as denoting persistence in a good deed
unto the end, may be a circumstance of every virtue, but it is
reckoned a part of fortitude in the sense stated in the body of the
Article.
Reply Obj. 6: Macrobius reckons the four aforesaid mentioned by
Tully, namely _confidence, magnificence, forbearance,_ which he puts
in the place of patience, and _firmness,_ which he substitutes for
perseverance. And he adds three, two of which, namely _magnanimity_
and _security,_ are comprised by Tully under the head of confidence.
But Macrobius is more specific in his enumeration. Because confidence
denotes a man's hope for great things: and hope for anything
presupposes an appetite stretching forth to great things by desire,
and this belongs to magnanimity. For it has been stated above (I-II,
Q. 40, A. 2) that hope presupposes love and desire of the thing hoped
for.
A still better reply is that confidence pertains to the certitude of
hope; while magnanimity refers to the magnitude of the thing hoped
for. Now hope has no firmness unless its contrary be removed, for
sometimes one, for one's own part, would hope for something, but hope
is avoided on account of the obstacle of fear, since fear is somewhat
contrary to hope, as stated above, (I-II, Q. 40, A. 4, ad 1). Hence
Macrobius adds security, which banishes fear. He adds a third, namely
constancy, which may be comprised under magnificence. For in
performing deeds of magnificence one needs to have a constant mind.
For this reason Tully says that magnificence consists not only in
accomplishing great things, but also in discussing them generously in
the mind. Constancy may also pertain to perseverance, so that one may
be called persevering through not desisting on account of delays, and
constant through not desisting on account of any other obstacles.
Those that are mentioned by Andronicus seem to amount to the same as
the above. For with Tully and Macrobius he mentions _perseverance_
and _magnificence,_ and with Macrobius, _magnanimity. Strength of
will_ is the same as patience or forbearance, for he says that
"strength of will is a habit that makes one ready to attempt what
ought to be attempted, and to endure what reason says should be
endured"--i.e. good courage seems to be the same as assurance, for he
defines it as "strength of soul in the accomplishment of its
purpose." Manliness is apparently the same as confidence, for he says
that "manliness is a habit of self-sufficiency in matters of virtue."
Besides magnificence he mentions _andragathia_, i.e. manly goodness
which we may render "strenuousness." For magnificence consists not
only in being constant in the accomplishment of great deeds, which
belongs to constancy, but also in bringing a certain manly prudence
and solicitude to that accomplishment, and this belongs to
_andragathia_, strenuousness: wherefore he says that _andragathia_ is
the virtue of a man, whereby he thinks out profitable works.
Accordingly it is evident that all these parts may be reduced to the
four principal parts mentioned by Tully.
Reply Obj. 7: The five mentioned by Aristotle fall short of the true
notion of virtue, for though they concur in the act of fortitude,
they differ as to motive, as stated above (Q. 123, A. 1, ad 2);
wherefore they are not reckoned parts but modes of fortitude.
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