Whether Fortitude Excels Among All Other Virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that fortitude excels among all other virtues.
For Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Fortitude is higher, so to speak,
than the rest."
Obj. 2: Further, virtue is about that which is difficult and good.
But fortitude is about most difficult things. Therefore it is the
greatest of the virtues.
Obj. 3: Further, the person of a man is more excellent than his
possessions. But fortitude is about a man's person, for it is this
that a man exposes to the danger of death for the good of virtue:
whereas justice and the other moral virtues are about other and
external things. Therefore fortitude is the chief of the moral
virtues.
Obj. 4: _On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i): "Justice is the
most resplendent of the virtues and gives its name to a good man."
Obj. 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 19): "Those virtues
must needs be greatest which are most profitable to others." Now
liberality seems to be more useful than fortitude. Therefore it is a
greater virtue.
_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Trin. vi), "In things that are
great, but not in bulk, to be great is to be good": wherefore the
better a virtue the greater it is. Now reason's good is man's good,
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) prudence, since it is a
perfection of reason, has the good essentially: while justice effects
this good, since it belongs to justice to establish the order of
reason in all human affairs: whereas the other virtues safeguard this
good, inasmuch as they moderate the passions, lest they lead man away
from reason's good. As to the order of the latter, fortitude holds
the first place, because fear of dangers of death has the greatest
power to make man recede from the good of reason: and after fortitude
comes temperance, since also pleasures of touch excel all others in
hindering the good of reason. Now to be a thing essentially ranks
before effecting it, and the latter ranks before safeguarding it by
removing obstacles thereto. Wherefore among the cardinal virtues,
prudence ranks first, justice second, fortitude third, temperance
fourth, and after these the other virtues.
Reply Obj. 1: Ambrose places fortitude before the other virtues, in
respect of a certain general utility, inasmuch as it is useful both
in warfare, and in matters relating to civil or home life. Hence he
begins by saying (De Offic. i): "Now we come to treat of fortitude,
which being higher so to speak than the others, is applicable both to
warlike and to civil matters."
Reply Obj. 2: Virtue essentially regards the good rather than the
difficult. Hence the greatness of a virtue is measured according to
its goodness rather than its difficulty.
Reply Obj. 3: A man does not expose his person to dangers of death
except in order to safeguard justice: wherefore the praise awarded to
fortitude depends somewhat on justice. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic.
i) that "fortitude without justice is an occasion of injustice; since
the stronger a man is the more ready is he to oppress the weaker."
The Fourth argument is granted.
Reply Obj. 5: Liberality is useful in conferring certain particular
favors: whereas a certain general utility attaches to fortitude,
since it safeguards the whole order of justice. Hence the Philosopher
says (Rhet. i, 9) that "just and brave men are most beloved, because
they are most useful in war and peace."
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