Whether the Other Six Precepts of the Decalogue Are Fittingly
Expressed?
Objection 1: It seems that the other six precepts of the decalogue
are unfittingly expressed. For it is not sufficient for salvation
that one refrain from injuring one's neighbor; but it is required
that one pay one's debts, according to Rom. 13:7, "Render . . . to
all men their dues." Now the last six precepts merely forbid one to
injure one's neighbor. Therefore these precepts are unfittingly
expressed.
Obj. 2: Further, these precepts forbid murder, adultery, stealing and
bearing false witness. But many other injuries can be inflicted on
one's neighbor, as appears from those which have been specified above
(QQ. 72, seq.). Therefore it seems that the aforesaid precepts are
unfittingly expressed.
Obj. 3: Further, concupiscence may be taken in two ways. First as
denoting an act of the will, as in Wis. 6:21, "The desire
(_concupiscentia_) of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom":
secondly, as denoting an act of the sensuality, as in James 4:1,
"From whence are wars and contentions among you? Are they not . . .
from your concupiscences which war in your members?" Now the
concupiscence of the sensuality is not forbidden by a precept of the
decalogue, otherwise first movements would be mortal sins, as they
would be against a precept of the decalogue. Nor is the concupiscence
of the will forbidden, since it is included in every sin. Therefore
it is unfitting for the precepts of the decalogue to include some
that forbid concupiscence.
Obj. 4: Further, murder is a more grievous sin than adultery or
theft. But there is no precept forbidding the desire of murder.
Therefore neither was it fitting to have precepts forbidding the
desire of theft and of adultery.
_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture.
_I answer that,_ Just as by the parts of justice a man pays that
which is due to certain definite persons, to whom he is bound for
some special reason, so too by justice properly so called he pays
that which is due to all in general. Hence, after the three precepts
pertaining to religion, whereby man pays what is due God, and after
the fourth precept pertaining to piety, whereby he pays what is due
to his parents--which duty includes the paying of all that is due for
any special reason--it was necessary in due sequence to give certain
precepts pertaining to justice properly so called, which pays to all
indifferently what is due to them.
Reply Obj. 1: Man is bound towards all persons in general to inflict
injury on no one: hence the negative precepts, which forbid the doing
of those injuries that can be inflicted on one's neighbor, had to be
given a place, as general precepts, among the precepts of the
decalogue. On the other hand, the duties we owe to our neighbor are
paid in different ways to different people: hence it did not behoove
to include affirmative precepts about those duties among the precepts
of the decalogue.
Reply Obj. 2: All other injuries that are inflicted on our neighbor
are reducible to those that are forbidden by these precepts, as
taking precedence of others in point of generality and importance.
For all injuries that are inflicted on the person of our neighbor are
understood to be forbidden under the head of murder as being the
principal of all. Those that are inflicted on a person connected with
one's neighbor, especially by way of lust, are understood to be
forbidden together with adultery: those that come under the head of
damage done to property are understood to be forbidden together with
theft: and those that are comprised under speech, such as
detractions, insults, and so forth, are understood to be forbidden
together with the bearing of false witness, which is more directly
opposed to justice.
Reply Obj. 3: The precepts forbidding concupiscence do not include
the prohibition of first movements of concupiscence, that do not go
farther than the bounds of sensuality. The direct object of their
prohibition is the consent of the will, which is directed to deed or
pleasure.
Reply Obj. 4: Murder in itself is an object not of concupiscence but
of horror, since it has not in itself the aspect of good. On the
other hand, adultery has the aspect of a certain kind of good, i.e.
of something pleasurable, and theft has an aspect of good, i.e. of
something useful: and good of its very nature has the aspect of
something concupiscible. Hence the concupiscence of theft and
adultery had to be forbidden by special precepts, but not the
concupiscence of murder.
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TREATISE ON FORTITUDE AND TEMPERANCE (QQ. 123-170)
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