THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 122, Art. 3]

Whether the Second Precept of the Decalogue Is Fittingly Expressed?

Objection 1: It seems that the second precept of the decalogue is

unfittingly expressed. For this precept, "Thou shalt not take the

name of thy God in vain" is thus explained by a gloss on Ex. 20:7:

"Thou shalt not deem the Son of God to be a creature," so that it

forbids an error against faith. Again, a gloss on the words of Deut.

5:11, "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain," adds,

i.e. "by giving the name of God to wood or stone," as though they

forbade a false confession of faith, which, like error, is an act of

unbelief. Now unbelief precedes superstition, as faith precedes

religion. Therefore this precept should have preceded the first,

whereby superstition is forbidden.

Obj. 2: Further, the name of God is taken for many purposes--for

instance, those of praise, of working miracles, and generally

speaking in conjunction with all we say or do, according to Col.

3:17, "All whatsoever you do in word or in work . . . do ye in the

name of the Lord." Therefore the precept forbidding the taking of

God's name in vain seems to be more universal than the precept

forbidding superstition, and thus should have preceded it.

Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on Ex. 20:7 expounds the precept, "Thou

shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain," namely, by

swearing to nothing. Hence this precept would seem to forbid useless

swearing, that is to say, swearing without judgment. But false

swearing, which is without truth, and unjust swearing, which is

without justice, are much more grievous. Therefore this precept

should rather have forbidden them.

Obj. 4: Further, blasphemy or any word or deed that is an insult to

God is much more grievous than perjury. Therefore blasphemy and other

like sins should rather have been forbidden by this precept.

Obj. 5: Further, God's names are many. Therefore it should not have

been said indefinitely: "Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy

God in vain."

_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Scripture.

_I answer that,_ In one who is being instructed in virtue it is

necessary to remove obstacles to true religion before establishing

him in true religion. Now a thing is opposed to true religion in two

ways. First, by excess, when, to wit, that which belongs to religion

is given to others than to whom it is due, and this pertains to

superstition. Secondly, by lack, as it were, of reverence, when, to

wit, God is contemned, and this pertains to the vice of irreligion,

as stated above (Q. 97, in the preamble, and in the Article that

follows). Now superstition hinders religion by preventing man from

acknowledging God so as to worship Him: and when a man's mind is

engrossed in some undue worship, he cannot at the same time give due

worship to God, according to Isa. 28:20, "The bed is straitened, so

that one must fall out," i.e. either the true God or a false god must

fall out from man's heart, "and a short covering cannot cover both."

On the other hand, irreligion hinders religion by preventing man from

honoring God after he has acknowledged Him. Now one must first of all

acknowledge God with a view to worship, before honoring Him we have

acknowledged.

For this reason the precept forbidding superstition is placed before

the second precept, which forbids perjury that pertains to irreligion.

Reply Obj. 1: These expositions are mystical. The literal

explanation is that which is given Deut. 5:11: "Thou shalt not take

the name of . . . thy God in vain," namely, "by swearing on that

which is not [*Vulg.: 'for he shall not be unpunished that taketh His

name upon a vain thing']."

Reply Obj. 2: This precept does not forbid all taking of the name of

God, but properly the taking of God's name in confirmation of a man's

word by way of an oath, because men are wont to take God's name more

frequently in this way. Nevertheless we may understand that in

consequence all inordinate taking of the Divine name is forbidden by

this precept: and it is in this sense that we are to take the

explanation quoted in the First Objection.

Reply Obj. 3: To swear to nothing means to swear to that which is

not. This pertains to false swearing, which is chiefly called

perjury, as stated above (Q. 98, A. 1, ad 3). For when a man swears

to that which is false, his swearing is vain in itself, since it is

not supported by the truth. On the other hand, when a man swears

without judgment, through levity, if he swear to the truth, there is

no vanity on the part of the oath itself, but only on the part of the

swearer.

Reply Obj. 4: Just as when we instruct a man in some science, we

begin by putting before him certain general maxims, even so the Law,

which forms man to virtue by instructing him in the precepts of the

decalogue, which are the first of all precepts, gave expression, by

prohibition or by command, to those things which are of most common

occurrence in the course of human life. Hence the precepts of the

decalogue include the prohibition of perjury, which is of more

frequent occurrence than blasphemy, since man does not fall so often

into the latter sin.

Reply Obj. 5: Reverence is due to the Divine names on the part of the

thing signified, which is one, and not on the part of the signifying

words, which are many. Hence it is expressed in the singular: "Thou

shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain": since it matters

not in which of God's names perjury is committed.

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 755 / 1128 题