Whether Prodigality Is a More Grievous Sin Than Covetousness?
Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is a more grievous sin than
covetousness. For by covetousness a man injures his neighbor by not
communicating his goods to him, whereas by prodigality a man injures
himself, because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "the
wasting of riches, which are the means whereby a man lives, is an
undoing of his very being." Now he that injures himself sins more
grievously, according to Ecclus. 14:5, "He that is evil to himself,
to whom will he be good?" Therefore prodigality is a more grievous
sin than covetousness.
Obj. 2: Further, a disorder that is accompanied by a laudable
circumstance is less sinful. Now the disorder of covetousness is
sometimes accompanied by a laudable circumstance, as in the case of
those who are unwilling to spend their own, lest they be driven to
accept from others: whereas the disorder of prodigality is
accompanied by a circumstance that calls for blame, inasmuch as we
ascribe prodigality to those who are intemperate, as the Philosopher
observes (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin
than covetousness.
Obj. 3: Further, prudence is chief among the moral virtues, as stated
above (Q. 56, A. 1, ad 1; I-II, Q. 61, A. 2, ad 1). Now prodigality
is more opposed to prudence than covetousness is: for it is written
(Prov. 21:20): "There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the
dwelling of the just; and the foolish man shall spend it": and the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "it is the mark of a fool to
give too much and receive nothing." Therefore prodigality is a more
grievous sin than covetousness.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "the
prodigal seems to be much better than the illiberal man."
_I answer that,_ Prodigality considered in itself is a less grievous
sin than covetousness, and this for three reasons. First, because
covetousness differs more from the opposite virtue: since giving,
wherein the prodigal exceeds, belongs to liberality more than
receiving or retaining, wherein the covetous man exceeds. Secondly,
because the prodigal man is of use to the many to whom he gives,
while the covetous man is of use to no one, not even to himself, as
stated in _Ethic._ iv, 6. Thirdly, because prodigality is easily
cured. For not only is the prodigal on the way to old age, which is
opposed to prodigality, but he is easily reduced to a state of want,
since much useless spending impoverishes him and makes him unable to
exceed in giving. Moreover, prodigality is easily turned into virtue
on account of its likeness thereto. On the other hand, the covetous
man is not easily cured, for the reason given above (Q. 118, A. 5, ad
3).
Reply Obj. 1: The difference between the prodigal and the covetous
man is not that the former sins against himself and the latter
against another. For the prodigal sins against himself by spending
that which is his, and his means of support, and against others by
spending the wherewithal to help others. This applies chiefly to the
clergy, who are the dispensers of the Church's goods, that belong to
the poor whom they defraud by their prodigal expenditure. In like
manner the covetous man sins against others, by being deficient in
giving; and he sins against himself, through deficiency in spending:
wherefore it is written (Eccles. 6:2): "A man to whom God hath given
riches . . . yet doth not give him the power to eat thereof."
Nevertheless the prodigal man exceeds in this, that he injures both
himself and others yet so as to profit some; whereas the covetous man
profits neither others nor himself, since he does not even use his
own goods for his own profit.
Reply Obj. 2: In speaking of vices in general, we judge of them
according to their respective natures: thus, with regard to
prodigality we note that it consumes riches to excess, and with
regard to covetousness that it retains them to excess. That one spend
too much for the sake of intemperance points already to several
additional sins, wherefore the prodigal of this kind is worse, as
stated in _Ethic._ iv, 1. That an illiberal or covetous man refrain
from taking what belongs to others, although this appears in itself
to call for praise, yet on account of the motive for which he does so
it calls for blame, since he is unwilling to accept from others lest
he be forced to give to others.
Reply Obj. 3: All vices are opposed to prudence, even as all virtues
are directed by prudence: wherefore if a vice be opposed to prudence
alone, for this very reason it is deemed less grievous.
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