Whether Prodigality Is Opposite to Covetousness?
Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is not opposite to
covetousness. For opposites cannot be together in the same subject.
But some are at the same time prodigal and covetous. Therefore
prodigality is not opposite to covetousness.
Obj. 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But
covetousness, as opposed to liberality, relates to certain passions
whereby man is affected towards money: whereas prodigality does not
seem to relate to any passions of the soul, since it is not affected
towards money, or to anything else of the kind. Therefore prodigality
is not opposite to covetousness.
Obj. 3: Further, sin takes its species chiefly from its end, as
stated above (I-II, Q. 62, A. 3). Now prodigality seems always to be
directed to some unlawful end, for the sake of which the prodigal
squanders his goods. Especially is it directed to pleasures,
wherefore it is stated (Luke 15:13) of the prodigal son that he
"wasted his substance living riotously." Therefore it seems that
prodigality is opposed to temperance and insensibility rather than to
covetousness and liberality.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1) that
prodigality is opposed to liberality, and illiberality, to which we
give here the name of covetousness.
_I answer that,_ In morals vices are opposed to one another and to
virtue in respect of excess and deficiency. Now covetousness and
prodigality differ variously in respect of excess and deficiency.
Thus, as regards affection for riches, the covetous man exceeds by
loving them more than he ought, while the prodigal is deficient, by
being less careful of them than he ought: and as regards external
action, prodigality implies excess in giving, but deficiency in
retaining and acquiring, while covetousness, on the contrary, denotes
deficiency in giving, but excess in acquiring and retaining. Hence it
is evident that prodigality is opposed to covetousness.
Reply Obj. 1: Nothing prevents opposites from being in the same
subject in different respects. For a thing is denominated more from
what is in it principally. Now just as in liberality, which observes
the mean, the principal thing is giving, to which receiving and
retaining are subordinate, so, too, covetousness and prodigality
regard principally giving. Wherefore he who exceeds in giving is said
to be "prodigal," while he who is deficient in giving is said to be
"covetous." Now it happens sometimes that a man is deficient in
giving, without exceeding in receiving, as the Philosopher observes
(Ethic. iv, 1). And in like manner it happens sometimes that a man
exceeds in giving, and therefore is prodigal, and yet at the same
time exceeds in receiving. This may be due either to some kind of
necessity, since while exceeding in giving he is lacking in goods of
his own, so that he is driven to acquire unduly, and this pertains to
covetousness; or it may be due to inordinateness of the mind, for he
gives not for a good purpose, but, as though despising virtue, cares
not whence or how he receives. Wherefore he is prodigal and covetous
in different respects.
Reply Obj. 2: Prodigality regards passions in respect of money, not
as exceeding, but as deficient in them.
Reply Obj. 3: The prodigal does not always exceed in giving for the
sake of pleasures which are the matter of temperance, but sometimes
through being so disposed as not to care about riches, and sometimes
on account of something else. More frequently, however, he inclines
to intemperance, both because through spending too much on other
things he becomes fearless of spending on objects of pleasure, to
which the concupiscence of the flesh is more prone; and because
through taking no pleasure in virtuous goods, he seeks for himself
pleasures of the body. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1)
"that many a prodigal ends in becoming intemperate."
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