Whether Liberality Is the Greatest of the Virtues?
Objection 1: It seems that liberality is the greatest of the virtues.
For every virtue of man is a likeness to the divine goodness. Now man
is likened chiefly by liberality to God, "Who giveth to all men
abundantly, and upbraideth not" (James 1:5). Therefore liberality is
the greatest of the virtues.
Obj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 8), "in things
that are great, but not in bulk, to be greatest is to be best." Now
the nature of goodness seems to pertain mostly to liberality, since
"the good is self-communicative," according to Dionysius (Div. Nom.
iv). Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "justice reclines to
severity, liberality to goodness." Therefore liberality is the
greatest of virtues.
Obj. 3: Further, men are honored and loved on account of virtue. Now
Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that "bounty above all makes a man
famous": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "among the
virtuous the liberal are the most beloved." Therefore liberality is
the greatest of virtues.
_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "justice seems to
be more excellent than liberality, although liberality is more
pleasing." The Philosopher also says (Rhet. i, 9) that "brave and
just men are honored chiefly and, after them, those who are liberal."
_I answer that,_ Every virtue tends towards a good; wherefore the
greater virtue is that which tends towards the greater good. Now
liberality tends towards a good in two ways: in one way, primarily
and of its own nature; in another way, consequently. Primarily and of
its very nature it tends to set in order one's own affection towards
the possession and use of money. In this way temperance, which
moderates desires and pleasures relating to one's own body, takes
precedence of liberality: and so do fortitude and justice, which, in
a manner, are directed to the common good, one in time of peace, the
other in time of war: while all these are preceded by those virtues
which are directed to the Divine good. For the Divine good surpasses
all manner of human good; and among human goods the public good
surpasses the good of the individual; and of the last named the good
of the body surpasses those goods that consist of external things.
Again, liberality is ordained to a good consequently, and in this way
it is directed to all the aforesaid goods. For by reason of his not
being a lover of money, it follows that a man readily makes use of
it, whether for himself, or for the good of others, or for God's
glory. Thus it derives a certain excellence from being useful in many
ways. Since, however, we should judge of things according to that
which is competent to them primarily and in respect of their nature,
rather than according to that which pertains to them. Consequently,
it remains to be said that liberality is not the greatest of virtues.
Reply Obj. 1: God's giving proceeds from His love for those to whom
He gives, not from His affection towards the things He gives,
wherefore it seems to pertain to charity, the greatest of virtues,
rather than to liberality.
Reply Obj. 2: Every virtue shares the nature of goodness by giving
forth its own act: and the acts of certain other virtues are better
than money which liberality gives forth.
Reply Obj. 3: The friendship whereby a liberal man is beloved is not
that which is based on virtue, as though he were better than others,
but that which is based on utility, because he is more useful in
external goods, which as a rule men desire above all others. For the
same reason he becomes famous.
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