Whether Truth Is a Part of Justice?
Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a part of justice. For it
seems proper to justice to give another man his due. But, by telling
the truth, one does not seem to give another man his due, as is the
case in all the foregoing parts of justice. Therefore truth is not a
part of justice.
Obj. 2: Further, truth pertains to the intellect: whereas justice is
in the will, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 4). Therefore truth is not a
part of justice.
Obj. 3: Further, according to Jerome truth is threefold, namely,
"truth of life," "truth of justice," and "truth of doctrine." But
none of these is a part of justice. For truth of life comprises all
virtues, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3): truth of justice is the same
as justice, so that it is not one of its parts; and truth of doctrine
belongs rather to the intellectual virtues. Therefore truth is nowise
a part of justice.
_On the contrary,_ Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons truth among
the parts of justice.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 80), a virtue is annexed to
justice, as secondary to a principal virtue, through having something
in common with justice, while falling short from the perfect virtue
thereof. Now the virtue of truth has two things in common with
justice. In the first place it is directed to another, since the
manifestation, which we have stated to be an act of truth, is
directed to another, inasmuch as one person manifests to another the
things that concern himself. In the second place, justice sets up a
certain equality between things, and this the virtue of truth does
also, for it equals signs to the things which concern man himself.
Nevertheless it falls short of the proper aspect of justice, as to
the notion of debt: for this virtue does not regard legal debt, which
justice considers, but rather the moral debt, in so far as, out of
equity, one man owes another a manifestation of the truth. Therefore
truth is a part of justice, being annexed thereto as a secondary
virtue to its principal.
Reply Obj. 1: Since man is a social animal, one man naturally owes
another whatever is necessary for the preservation of human society.
Now it would be impossible for men to live together, unless they
believed one another, as declaring the truth one to another. Hence
the virtue of truth does, in a manner, regard something as being due.
Reply Obj. 2: Truth, as known, belongs to the intellect. But man, by
his own will, whereby he uses both habits and members, utters
external signs in order to manifest the truth, and in this way the
manifestation of the truth is an act of the will.
Reply Obj. 3: The truth of which we are speaking now differs from the
truth of life, as stated in the preceding A. 2, ad 3.
We speak of the truth of justice in two ways. In one way we refer to
the fact that justice itself is a certain rectitude regulated
according to the rule of the divine law; and in this way the truth of
justice differs from the truth of life, because by the truth of life
a man lives aright in himself, whereas by the truth of justice a man
observes the rectitude of the law in those judgments which refer to
another man: and in this sense the truth of justice has nothing to do
with the truth of which we speak now, as neither has the truth of
life. In another way the truth of justice may be understood as
referring to the fact that, out of justice, a man manifests the
truth, as for instance when a man confesses the truth, or gives true
evidence in a court of justice. This truth is a particular act of
justice, and does not pertain directly to this truth of which we are
now speaking, because, to wit, in this manifestation of the truth a
man's chief intention is to give another man his due. Hence the
Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) in describing this virtue: "We are
not speaking of one who is truthful in his agreements, nor does this
apply to matters in which justice or injustice is questioned."
The truth of doctrine consists in a certain manifestation of truths
relating to science wherefore neither does this truth directly pertain
to this virtue, but only that truth whereby a man, both in life and in
speech, shows himself to be such as he is, and the things that concern
him, not other, and neither greater nor less, than they are.
Nevertheless since truths of science, as known by us, are something
concerning us, and pertain to this virtue, in this sense the truth of
doctrine may pertain to this virtue, as well as any other kind of
truth whereby a man manifests, by word or deed, what he knows.
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