Whether Vengeance Should Be Taken on Those Who Have Sinned
Involuntarily?
Objection 1: It seems that vengeance should be taken on those who
have sinned involuntarily. For the will of one man does not follow
from the will of another. Yet one man is punished for another,
according to Ex. 20:5, "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the
iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth
generation." Thus for the sin of Cham, his son Chanaan was cursed
(Gen. 9:25) and for the sin of Giezi, his descendants were struck
with leprosy (4 Kings 5). Again the blood of Christ lays the
descendants of the Jews under the ban of punishment, for they said
(Matt. 27:25): "His blood be upon us and upon our children." Moreover
we read (Josue 7) that the people of Israel were delivered into the
hands of their enemies for the sin of Achan, and that the same people
were overthrown by the Philistines on account of the sin of the sons
of Heli (1 Kings 4). Therefore a person is to be punished without
having deserved it voluntarily.
Obj. 2: Further, nothing is voluntary except what is in a man's
power. But sometimes a man is punished for what is not in his power;
thus a man is removed from the administration of the Church on
account of being infected with leprosy; and a Church ceases to be an
episcopal see on account of the depravity or evil of the people.
Therefore vengeance is taken not only for voluntary sins.
Obj. 3: Further, ignorance makes an act involuntary. Now vengeance is
sometimes taken on the ignorant. Thus the children of the people of
Sodom, though they were in invincible ignorance, perished with their
parents (Gen. 19). Again, for the sin of Dathan and Abiron their
children were swallowed up together with them (Num 16). Moreover,
dumb animals, which are devoid of reason, were commanded to be slain
on account of the sin of the Amalekites (1 Kings 15). Therefore
vengeance is sometimes taken on those who have deserved it
involuntarily.
Obj. 4: Further, compulsion is most opposed to voluntariness. But a
man does not escape the debt of punishment through being compelled by
fear to commit a sin. Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those
who have deserved it involuntarily.
Obj. 5: Further Ambrose says on Luke 5 that "the ship in which Judas
was, was in distress"; wherefore "Peter, who was calm in the security
of his own merits, was in distress about those of others." But Peter
did not will the sin of Judas. Therefore a person is sometimes
punished without having voluntarily deserved it.
_On the contrary,_ Punishment is due to sin. But every sin is
voluntary according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i).
Therefore vengeance should be taken only on those who have deserved
it voluntarily.
_I answer that,_ Punishment may be considered in two ways. First,
under the aspect of punishment, and in this way punishment is not due
save for sin, because by means of punishment the equality of justice
is restored, in so far as he who by sinning has exceeded in following
his own will suffers something that is contrary to this will.
Wherefore, since every sin is voluntary, not excluding original sin,
as stated above (I-II, Q. 81, A. 1), it follows that no one is
punished in this way, except for something done voluntarily.
Secondly, punishment may be considered as a medicine, not only
healing the past sin, but also preserving from future sin, or
conducing to some good, and in this way a person is sometimes
punished without any fault of his own, yet not without cause.
It must, however, be observed that a medicine never removes a greater
good in order to promote a lesser; thus the medicine of the body
never blinds the eye, in order to repair the heel: yet sometimes it
is harmful in lesser things that it may be helpful in things of
greater consequence. And since spiritual goods are of the greatest
consequence, while temporal goods are least important, sometimes a
person is punished in his temporal goods without any fault of his
own. Such are many of the punishments inflicted by God in this
present life for our humiliation or probation. But no one is punished
in spiritual goods without any fault on his part, neither in this nor
in the future life, because in the latter punishment is not
medicinal, but a result of spiritual condemnation.
Reply Obj. 1: A man is never condemned to a spiritual punishment for
another man's sin, because spiritual punishment affects the soul, in
respect of which each man is master of himself. But sometimes a man
is condemned to punishment in temporal matters for the sin of
another, and this for three reasons. First, because one man may be
the temporal goods of another, and so he may be punished in
punishment of the latter: thus children, as to the body, are a
belonging of their father, and slaves are a possession of their
master. Secondly, when one person's sin is transmitted to another,
either by _imitation,_ as children copy the sins of their parents,
and slaves the sins of their masters, so as to sin with greater
daring; or by way of _merit,_ as the sinful subjects merit a sinful
superior, according to Job 34:30, "Who maketh a man that is a
hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people?" Hence the people of
Israel were punished for David's sin in numbering the people (2 Kings
24). This may also happen through some kind of _consent_ or
_connivance:_ thus sometimes even the good are punished in temporal
matters together with the wicked, for not having condemned their
sins, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9). Thirdly, in order to mark
the unity of human fellowship, whereby one man is bound to be
solicitous for another, lest he sin; and in order to inculcate horror
of sin, seeing that the punishment of one affects all, as though all
were one body, as Augustine says in speaking of the sin of Achan (QQ.
sup. Josue viii). The saying of the Lord, "Visiting the iniquity of
the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation,"
seems to belong to mercy rather than to severity, since He does not
take vengeance forthwith, but waits for some future time, in order
that the descendants at least may mend their ways; yet should the
wickedness of the descendants increase, it becomes almost necessary
to take vengeance on them.
Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine states (QQ. sup. Josue viii), human
judgment should conform to the divine judgment, when this is
manifest, and God condemns men spiritually for their own sins. But
human judgment cannot be conformed to God's hidden judgments, whereby
He punishes certain persons in temporal matters without any fault of
theirs, since man is unable to grasp the reasons of these judgments
so as to know what is expedient for each individual. Wherefore
according to human judgment a man should never be condemned without
fault of his own to an inflictive punishment, such as death,
mutilation or flogging. But a man may be condemned, even according to
human judgment, to a punishment of forfeiture, even without any fault
on his part, but not without cause: and this in three ways.
First, through a person becoming, without any fault of his,
disqualified for having or acquiring a certain good: thus for being
infected with leprosy a man is removed from the administration of the
Church: and for bigamy, or through pronouncing a death sentence a man
is hindered from receiving sacred orders.
Secondly, because the particular good that he forfeits is not his own
but common property: thus that an episcopal see be attached to a
certain church belongs to the good of the whole city, and not only to
the good of the clerics.
Thirdly, because the good of one person may depend on the good of
another: thus in the crime of high treason a son loses his
inheritance through the sin of his parent.
Reply Obj. 3: By the judgment of God children are punished in
temporal matters together with their parents, both because they are a
possession of their parents, so that their parents are punished also
in their person, and because this is for their good lest, should they
be spared, they might imitate the sins of their parents, and thus
deserve to be punished still more severely. Vengeance is wrought on
dumb animals and any other irrational creatures, because in this way
their owners are punished; and also in horror of sin.
Reply Obj. 4: An act done through compulsion of fear is not
involuntary simply, but has an admixture of voluntariness, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 6, AA. 5, 6).
Reply Obj. 5: The other apostles were distressed about the sin of
Judas, in the same way as the multitude is punished for the sin of
one, in commendation of unity, as state above (Reply Obj. 1, 2).
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