Whether Ingratitude Is Always a Sin?
Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is not always a sin. For
Seneca says (De Benef. iii) that "he who does not repay a favor is
ungrateful." But sometimes it is impossible to repay a favor without
sinning, for instance if one man has helped another to commit a sin.
Therefore, since it is not a sin to refrain from sinning, it seems
that ingratitude is not always a sin.
Obj. 2: Further, every sin is in the power of the person who commits
it: because, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i),
"no man sins in what he cannot avoid." Now sometimes it is not in the
power of the sinner to avoid ingratitude, for instance when he has
not the means of repaying. Again forgetfulness is not in our power,
and yet Seneca declares (De Benef. iii) that "to forget a kindness is
the height of ingratitude." Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin.
Obj. 3: Further, there would seem to be no repayment in being
unwilling to owe anything, according to the Apostle (Rom. 13:8), "Owe
no man anything." Yet "an unwilling debtor is ungrateful," as Seneca
declares (De Benef. iv). Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin.
_On the contrary,_ Ingratitude is reckoned among other sins (2 Tim.
3:2), where it is written: "Disobedient to parents, ungrateful,
wicked." etc.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 106, A. 4, ad 1, A. 6) a debt of
gratitude is a moral debt required by virtue. Now a thing is a sin
from the fact of its being contrary to virtue. Wherefore it is
evident that every ingratitude is a sin.
Reply Obj. 1: Gratitude regards a favor received: and he that helps
another to commit a sin does him not a favor but an injury: and so no
thanks are due to him, except perhaps on account of his good will,
supposing him to have been deceived, and to have thought to help him
in doing good, whereas he helped him to sin. In such a case the
repayment due to him is not that he should be helped to commit a sin,
because this would be repaying not good but evil, and this is
contrary to gratitude.
Reply Obj. 2: No man is excused from ingratitude through inability to
repay, for the very reason that the mere will suffices for the
repayment of the debt of gratitude, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 6, ad
1).
Forgetfulness of a favor received amounts to ingratitude, not indeed
the forgetfulness that arises from a natural defect, that is not
subject to the will, but that which arises from negligence. For, as
Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), "when forgetfulness of favors lays
hold of a man, he has apparently given little thought to their
repayment."
Reply Obj. 3: The debt of gratitude flows from the debt of love, and
from the latter no man should wish to be free. Hence that anyone
should owe this debt unwillingly seems to arise from lack of love for
his benefactor.
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