THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 99, Art. 3]

Whether the Species of Sacrilege Are Distinguished According to the

Sacred Things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the species of sacrilege are not

distinguished according to the sacred things. Material diversity does

not differentiate species, if the formal aspect remains the same. Now

there would seem to be the same formal aspect of sin in all

violations of sacred things, and that the only difference is one of

matter. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not distinguished

thereby.

Obj. 2: Further, it does not seem possible that things belonging to

the same species should at the same time differ specifically. Now

murder, theft, and unlawful intercourse, are different species of

sin. Therefore they cannot belong to the one same species of

sacrilege: and consequently it seems that the species of sacrilege

are distinguished in accordance with the species of other sins, and

not according to the various sacred things.

Obj. 3: Further, among sacred things sacred persons are reckoned. If,

therefore, one species of sacrilege arises from the violation of a

sacred person, it would follow that every sin committed by a sacred

person is a sacrilege, since every sin violates the person of the

sinner. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not reckoned according

to the sacred things.

_On the contrary,_ Acts and habits are distinguished by their

objects. Now the sacred thing is the object of sacrilege, as stated

above (A. 1). Therefore the species of sacrilege are distinguished

according to the sacred things.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the sin of sacrilege

consists in the irreverent treatment of a sacred thing. Now reverence

is due to a sacred thing by reason of its holiness: and consequently

the species of sacrilege must needs be distinguished according to the

different aspects of sanctity in the sacred things which are treated

irreverently: for the greater the holiness ascribed to the sacred

thing that is sinned against, the more grievous the sacrilege.

Now holiness is ascribed, not only to sacred persons, namely, those

who are consecrated to the divine worship, but also to sacred places

and to certain other sacred things. And the holiness of a place is

directed to the holiness of man, who worships God in a holy place.

For it is written (2 Macc. 5:19): "God did not choose the people for

the place's sake, but the place for the people's sake." Hence

sacrilege committed against a sacred person is a graver sin than that

which is committed against a sacred place. Yet in either species

there are various degrees of sacrilege, according to differences of

sacred persons and places.

In like manner the third species of sacrilege, which is committed

against other sacred things, has various degrees, according to the

differences of sacred things. Among these the highest place belongs

to the sacraments whereby man is sanctified: chief of which is the

sacrament of the Eucharist, for it contains Christ Himself. Wherefore

the sacrilege that is committed against this sacrament is the gravest

of all. The second place, after the sacraments, belongs to the

vessels consecrated for the administration of the sacraments; also

sacred images, and the relics of the saints, wherein the very persons

of the saints, so to speak, are reverenced and honored. After these

come things connected with the apparel of the Church and its

ministers; and those things, whether movable or immovable, that are

deputed to the upkeep of the ministers. And whoever sins against any

one of the aforesaid incurs the crime of sacrilege.

Reply Obj. 1: There is not the same aspect of holiness in all the

aforesaid: wherefore the diversity of sacred things is not only a

material, but also a formal difference.

Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders two things from belonging to one

species in one respect, and to different species in another respect.

Thus Socrates and Plato belong to the one species, "animal," but

differ in the species "colored thing," if one be white and the other

black. In like manner it is possible for two sins to differ

specifically as to their material acts, and to belong to the same

species as regards the one formal aspect of sacrilege: for instance,

the violation of a nun by blows or by copulation.

Reply Obj. 3: Every sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege

materially and accidentally as it were. Hence Jerome [*The quotation

is from St. Bernard, De Consideration. ii, 13] says that "a trifle on

a priest's lips is a sacrilege or a blasphemy." But formally and

properly speaking a sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege

only when it is committed against his holiness, for instance if a

virgin consecrated to God be guilty of fornication: and the same is

to be said of other instances.

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 646 / 1128 题