FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 98, Art. 1]

Whether It Is Necessary for Perjury That the Statement Confirmed on

Oath Be False?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary for perjury that

the statement confirmed on oath be false. As stated above (Q. 89, A.

3), an oath should be accompanied by judgment and justice no less

than by truth. Since therefore perjury is incurred through lack of

truth, it is incurred likewise through lack of judgment, as when one

swears indiscreetly, and through lack of justice, as when one swears

to something unjust.

Obj. 2: Further, that which confirms is more weighty than the thing

confirmed thereby: thus in a syllogism the premises are more weighty

than the conclusion. Now in an oath a man's statement is confirmed by

calling on the name of God. Therefore perjury seems to consist in

swearing by false gods rather than in a lack of truth in the human

statement which is confirmed on oath.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm.

clxxx): "Men swear falsely both in deceiving others and when they are

deceived themselves"; and he gives three examples. The first is:

"Supposing a man to swear, thinking that what he swears to is true,

whereas it is false"; the second is: "Take the instance of another

who knows the statement to be false, and swears to it as though it

were true"; and the third is: "Take another, who thinks his statement

false, and swears to its being true, while perhaps it is true," of

whom he says afterwards that he is a perjurer. Therefore one may be a

perjurer while swearing to the truth. Therefore falsehood is not

necessary for perjury.

_On the contrary,_ Perjury is defined "a falsehood confirmed by oath"

[*Hugh of St. Victor, Sum. Sent. iv, 5].

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 92, A. 2), moral acts take their

species from their end. Now the end of an oath is the confirmation of

a human assertion. To this confirmation falsehood is opposed: since

an assertion is confirmed by being firmly shown to be true; and this

cannot happen to that which is false. Hence falsehood directly annuls

the end of an oath: and for this reason, that perversity in swearing,

which is called perjury, takes its species chiefly from falsehood.

Consequently falsehood is essential to perjury.

Reply Obj. 1: As Jerome says on Jer. 4:2, "whichever of these three

be lacking, there is perjury," but in different order. For first and

chiefly perjury consists in a lack of truth, for the reason stated in

the Article. Secondly, there is perjury when justice is lacking, for

in whatever way a man swears to that which is unlawful, for this very

reason he is guilty of falsehood, since he is under an obligation to

do the contrary. Thirdly, there is perjury when judgment is lacking,

since by the very fact that a man swears indiscreetly, he incurs the

danger of lapsing into falsehood.

Reply Obj. 2: In syllogisms the premises are of greater weight, since

they are in the position of active principle, as stated in _Phys._

ii, 3: whereas in moral matters the end is of greater importance than

the active principle. Hence though it is a perverse oath when a man

swears to the truth by false gods, yet perjury takes its name from

that kind of perversity in an oath, that deprives the oath of its

end, by swearing what is false.

Reply Obj. 3: Moral acts proceed from the will, whose object is the

apprehended good. Wherefore if the false be apprehended as true, it

will be materially false, but formally true, as related to the will.

If something false be apprehended as false, it will be false both

materially and formally. If that which is true be apprehended as

false, it will be materially true, and formally false. Hence in each

of these cases the conditions required for perjury are to be found in

some way, on account of some measure of falsehood. Since, however,

that which is formal in anything is of greater importance than that

which is material, he that swears to a falsehood thinking it true is

not so much of a perjurer as he that swears to the truth thinking it

false. For Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. clxxx): "It

depends how the assertion proceeds from the mind, for the tongue is

not guilty except the mind be guilty."

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 639 / 1128 题