Whether Prayer Is an Act of the Appetitive Power?
Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is an act of the appetitive
power. It belongs to prayer to be heard. Now it is the desire that is
heard by God, according to Ps. 9:38, "The Lord hath heard the desire
of the poor." Therefore prayer is desire. But desire is an act of the
appetitive power: and therefore prayer is also.
Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii): "It is useful to
begin everything with prayer, because thereby we surrender ourselves
to God and unite ourselves to Him." Now union with God is effected by
love which belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore prayer belongs
to the appetitive power.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, 6) that there
are two operations of the intellective part. Of these the first is
"the understanding of indivisibles," by which operation we apprehend
what a thing is: while the second is "synthesis" and "analysis,"
whereby we apprehend that a thing is or is not. To these a third may
be added, namely, "reasoning," whereby we proceed from the known to
the unknown. Now prayer is not reducible to any of these operations.
Therefore it is an operation, not of the intellective, but of the
appetitive power.
_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. x) that "to pray is to speak."
Now speech belongs to the intellect. Therefore prayer is an act, not
of the appetitive, but of the intellective power.
_I answer that,_ According to Cassiodorus [*Comment. in Ps. 38:13]
"prayer (_oratio_) is spoken reason (_oris ratio_)." Now the
speculative and practical reason differ in this, that the speculative
merely apprehends its object, whereas the practical reason not only
apprehends but causes. Now one thing is the cause of another in two
ways: first perfectly, when it necessitates its effect, and this
happens when the effect is wholly subject to the power of the cause;
secondly imperfectly, by merely disposing to the effect, for the
reason that the effect is not wholly subject to the power of the
cause. Accordingly in this way the reason is cause of certain things
in two ways: first, by imposing necessity; and in this way it belongs
to reason, to command not only the lower powers and the members of
the body, but also human subjects, which indeed is done by
commanding; secondly, by leading up to the effect, and, in a way,
disposing to it, and in this sense the reason asks for something to
be done by things not subject to it, whether they be its equals or
its superiors. Now both of these, namely, to command and to ask or
beseech, imply a certain ordering, seeing that man proposes something
to be effected by something else, wherefore they pertain to the
reason to which it belongs to set in order. For this reason the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that the "reason exhorts us to do
what is best."
Now in the present instance we are speaking of prayer [*This last
paragraph refers to the Latin word _oratio_ (prayer) which originally
signified a speech, being derived in the first instance from _os,_
_oris_ (the mouth).] as signifying a beseeching or petition, in which
sense Augustine [*Rabanus, De Univ. vi, 14]: says (De Verb. Dom.)
that "prayer is a petition," and Damascene states (De Fide Orth. iii,
24) that "to pray is to ask becoming things of God." Accordingly it
is evident that prayer, as we speak of it now, is an act of reason.
Reply Obj. 1: The Lord is said to hear the desire of the poor, either
because desire is the cause of their petition, since a petition is
like the interpreter of a desire, or in order to show how speedily
they are heard, since no sooner do the poor desire something than God
hears them before they put up a prayer, according to the saying of
Isa. 65:24, "And it shall come to pass, that before they call, I will
hear."
Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (I, Q. 82, A. 4; I-II, Q. 9, A. 1, ad
3), the will moves the reason to its end: wherefore nothing hinders
the act of reason, under the motion of the will, from tending to an
end such as charity which is union with God. Now prayer tends to God
through being moved by the will of charity, as it were, and this in
two ways. First, on the part of the object of our petition, because
when we pray we ought principally to ask to be united to God,
according to Ps. 26:4, "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will
I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days
of my life." Secondly, on the part of the petitioner, who ought to
approach the person whom he petitions, either locally, as when he
petitions a man, or mentally, as when he petitions God. Hence
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "when we call upon God in our
prayers, we unveil our mind in His presence": and in the same sense
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that "prayer is the raising up
of the mind to God."
Reply Obj. 3: These three acts belong to the speculative reason, but
to the practical reason it belongs in addition to cause something by
way of command or of petition, as stated above.
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