Whether Religion Should Be Preferred to the Other Moral Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion should not be preferred to
the other moral virtues. The perfection of a moral virtue consists in
its observing the mean, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6. But religion
fails to observe the mean of justice, since it does not render an
absolute equal to God. Therefore religion is not more excellent than
the other moral virtues.
Obj. 2: Further, what is offered by one man to another is the more
praiseworthy, according as the person it is offered to is in greater
need: wherefore it is written (Isa. 57:7): "Deal thy bread to the
hungry." But God needs nothing that we can offer Him, according to
Ps. 15:2, "I have said: Thou art my God, for Thou hast no need of my
goods." Therefore religion would seem less praiseworthy than the
other virtues whereby man's needs are relieved.
Obj. 3: Further, the greater the obligation to do a thing, the less
praise does it deserve, according to 1 Cor. 9:16, "If I preach the
Gospel, it is no glory to me: a necessity lieth upon me." Now the
more a thing is due, the greater the obligation of paying it. Since,
then, what is paid to God by man is in the highest degree due to Him,
it would seem that religion is less praiseworthy than the other human
virtues.
_On the contrary,_ The precepts pertaining to religion are given
precedence (Ex. 20) as being of greatest importance. Now the order of
precepts is proportionate to the order of virtues, since the precepts
of the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Therefore religion is the chief
of the moral virtues.
_I answer that,_ Whatever is directed to an end takes its goodness
from being ordered to that end; so that the nearer it is to the end
the better it is. Now moral virtues, as stated above (A. 5; Q. 4, A.
7), are about matters that are ordered to God as their end. And
religion approaches nearer to God than the other moral virtues, in so
far as its actions are directly and immediately ordered to the honor
of God. Hence religion excels among the moral virtues.
Reply Obj. 1: Virtue is praised because of the will, not because of
the ability: and therefore if a man fall short of equality which is
the mean of justice, through lack of ability, his virtue deserves no
less praise, provided there be no failing on the part of his will.
Reply Obj. 2: In offering a thing to a man on account of its
usefulness to him, the more needy the man the more praiseworthy the
offering, because it is more useful: whereas we offer a thing to God
not on account of its usefulness to Him, but for the sake of His
glory, and on account of its usefulness to us.
Reply Obj. 3: Where there is an obligation to do a thing it loses the
luster of supererogation, but not the merit of virtue, provided it be
done voluntarily. Hence the argument proves nothing.
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