Whether Religion Is a Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not a virtue. Seemingly
it belongs to religion to pay reverence to God. But reverence is an
act of fear which is a gift, as stated above (Q. 19, A. 9). Therefore
religion is not a virtue but a gift.
Obj. 2: Further, every virtue is a free exercise of the will,
wherefore it is described as an "elective" or voluntary "habit"
[*Ethic. ii, 6]. Now, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3) _latria_ belongs
to religion, and _latria_ denotes a kind of servitude. Therefore
religion is not a virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, according to _Ethic._ ii, 1, aptitude for virtue is
in us by nature, wherefore things pertaining to virtue belong to the
dictate of natural reason. Now, it belongs to religion "to offer
ceremonial worship to the Godhead" [*Cf. A. 1], and ceremonial
matters, as stated above (I-II, Q. 99, A. 3, ad 2; Q. 101), do not
belong to the dictate of natural reason. Therefore religion is not a
virtue.
_On the contrary,_ It is enumerated with the other virtues, as
appears from what has been said above (Q. 80).
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 58, A. 3; I-II, Q. 55, AA. 3, 4)
"a virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his act good
likewise," wherefore we must needs say that every good act belongs to
a virtue. Now it is evident that to render anyone his due has the
aspect of good, since by rendering a person his due, one becomes
suitably proportioned to him, through being ordered to him in a
becoming manner. But order comes under the aspect of good, just as
mode and species, according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii). Since
then it belongs to religion to pay due honor to someone, namely, to
God, it is evident that religion is a virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: To pay reverence to God is an act of the gift of
fear. Now it belongs to religion to do certain things through
reverence for God. Hence it follows, not that religion is the same as
the gift of fear, but that it is referred thereto as to something more
excellent; for the gifts are more excellent than the moral virtues, as
stated above (Q. 9, A. 1, ad 3; I-II, Q. 68, A. 8).
Reply Obj. 2: Even a slave can voluntarily do his duty by his
master, and so "he makes a virtue of necessity" [*Jerome, Ep. liv, ad
Furiam.], by doing his duty voluntarily. In like manner, to render due
service to God may be an act of virtue, in so far as man does so
voluntarily.
Reply Obj. 3: It belongs to the dictate of natural reason that
man should do something through reverence for God. But that he should
do this or that determinate thing does not belong to the dictate of
natural reason, but is established by Divine or human law.
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