Whether the Virtues Annexed to Justice Are Suitably Enumerated?
Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues annexed to justice are
unsuitably enumerated. Tully [*De Invent. ii, 53] reckons six, viz.
"religion, piety, gratitude, revenge, observance, truth." Now revenge
is seemingly a species of commutative justice whereby revenge is
taken for injuries inflicted, as stated above (Q. 61, A. 4).
Therefore it should not be reckoned among the virtues annexed to
justice.
Obj. 2: Further, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons seven,
viz. "innocence, friendship, concord, piety, religion, affection,
humanity," several of which are omitted by Tully. Therefore the
virtues annexed to justice would seem to be insufficiently enumerated.
Obj. 3: Further, others reckon five parts of justice, viz.
"obedience" in respect of one's superiors, "discipline" with regard
to inferiors, "equity" as regards equals, "fidelity" and
"truthfulness" towards all; and of these "truthfulness" alone is
mentioned by Tully. Therefore he would seem to have enumerated
insufficiently the virtues annexed to justice.
Obj. 4: Further, the peripatetic Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckons
nine parts annexed to justice viz. "liberality, kindliness, revenge,
commonsense, [*_eugnomosyne_] piety, gratitude, holiness, just
exchange" and "just lawgiving"; and of all these it is evident that
Tully mentions none but "revenge." Therefore he would appear to have
made an incomplete enumeration.
Obj. 5: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. v, 10) mentions _epieikeia_ as
being annexed to justice: and yet seemingly it is not included in any
of the foregoing enumerations. Therefore the virtues annexed to
justice are insufficiently enumerated.
_I answer that,_ Two points must be observed about the virtues
annexed to a principal virtue. The first is that these virtues have
something in common with the principal virtue; and the second is that
in some respect they fall short of the perfection of that virtue.
Accordingly since justice is of one man to another as stated above
(Q. 58, A. 2), all the virtues that are directed to another person
may by reason of this common aspect be annexed to justice. Now the
essential character of justice consists in rendering to another his
due according to equality, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 11). Wherefore
in two ways may a virtue directed to another person fall short of the
perfection of justice: first, by falling short of the aspect of
equality; secondly, by falling short of the aspect of due. For
certain virtues there are which render another his due, but are
unable to render the equal due. In the first place, whatever man
renders to God is due, yet it cannot be equal, as though man rendered
to God as much as he owes Him, according to Ps. 115:12, "What shall I
render to the Lord for all the things that He hath rendered to me?"
In this respect _religion_ is annexed to justice since, according to
Tully (De invent. ii, 53), it consists in offering service and
ceremonial rites or worship to "some superior nature that men call
divine." Secondly, it is not possible to make to one's parents an
equal return of what one owes to them, as the Philosopher declares
(Ethic. viii, 14); and thus _piety_ is annexed to justice, for
thereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), a man "renders service
and constant deference to his kindred and the well-wishers of his
country." Thirdly, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), man
is unable to offer an equal meed for virtue, and thus _observance_ is
annexed to justice, consisting according to Tully (De invent. ii, 53)
in the "deference and honor rendered to those who excel in worth."
A falling short of the just due may be considered in respect of a
twofold due, moral or legal: wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. viii,
13) assigns a corresponding twofold just. The legal due is that which
one is bound to render by reason of a legal obligation; and this due
is chiefly the concern of justice, which is the principal virtue. On
the other hand, the moral due is that to which one is bound in
respect of the rectitude of virtue: and since a due implies
necessity, this kind of due has two degrees. For one due is so
necessary that without it moral rectitude cannot be ensured: and this
has more of the character of due. Moreover this due may be considered
from the point of view of the debtor, and in this way it pertains to
this kind of due that a man represent himself to others just as he
is, both in word and deed. Wherefore to justice is annexed _truth,_
whereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), present, past and future
things are told without perversion. It may also be considered from
the point of view of the person to whom it is due, by comparing the
reward he receives with what he has done--sometimes in good things;
and then annexed to justice we have _gratitude_ which "consists in
recollecting the friendship and kindliness shown by others, and in
desiring to pay them back," as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53)--and
sometimes in evil things, and then to justice is annexed _revenge,_
whereby, as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53), "we resist force,
injury or anything obscure* by taking vengeance or by self-defense."
[*St. Thomas read _obscurum,_ and explains it as meaning
_derogatory,_ infra Q. 108, A. 2. Cicero, however, wrote _obfuturum,_
i.e. _hurtful._]
There is another due that is necessary in the sense that it conduces
to greater rectitude, although without it rectitude may be ensured.
This due is the concern of _liberality,_ _affability_ or
_friendship,_ or the like, all of which Tully omits in the aforesaid
enumeration because there is little of the nature of anything due in
them.
Reply Obj. 1: The revenge taken by authority of a public power, in
accordance with a judge's sentence, belongs to commutative justice:
whereas the revenge which a man takes on his own initiative, though
not against the law, or which a man seeks to obtain from a judge,
belongs to the virtue annexed to justice.
Reply Obj. 2: Macrobius appears to have considered the two integral
parts of justice, namely, _declining from evil,_ to which _innocence_
belongs, and _doing good,_ to which the six others belong. Of these,
two would seem to regard relations between equals, namely,
_friendship_ in the external conduct and _concord_ internally; two
regard our relations toward superiors, namely, _piety_ to parents,
and _religion_ to God; while two regard our relations towards
inferiors, namely, _condescension,_ in so far as their good pleases
us, and _humanity,_ whereby we help them in their needs. For Isidore
says (Etym. x) that a man is said to be "humane, through having a
feeling of love and pity towards men: this gives its name to humanity
whereby we uphold one another." In this sense _friendship_ is
understood as directing our external conduct towards others, from
which point of view the Philosopher treats of it in _Ethic._ iv, 6.
_Friendship_ may also be taken as regarding properly the affections,
and as the Philosopher describes it in _Ethic._ viii and ix. In this
sense three things pertain to friendship, namely, _benevolence_ which
is here called _affection_; _concord,_ and _beneficence_ which is
here called _humanity._ These three, however, are omitted by Tully,
because, as stated above, they have little of the nature of a due.
Reply Obj. 3: _Obedience_ is included in observance, which Tully
mentions, because both reverential honor and obedience are due to
persons who excel. "Faithfulness whereby a man's acts agree with his
words" [*Cicero, De Repub. iv, De Offic. i, 7], is contained in
_truthfulness_ as to the observance of one's promises: yet
_truthfulness_ covers a wider ground, as we shall state further on
(Q. 109, AA. 1, 3). _Discipline_ is not due as a necessary duty,
because one is under no obligation to an inferior as such, although a
superior may be under an obligation to watch over his inferiors,
according to Matt. 24:45, "A faithful and wise servant, whom his lord
hath appointed over his family": and for this reason it is omitted by
Tully. It may, however, be included in humanity mentioned by
Macrobius; and equity under _epieikeia_ or under _friendship._
Reply Obj. 4: This enumeration contains some belonging to true
justice. To particular justice belongs _justice of exchange,_ which
he describes as "the habit of observing equality in commutations." To
legal justice, as regards things to be observed by all, he ascribes
_legislative justice,_ which he describes as "the science of
political commutations relating to the community." As regards things
which have to be done in particular cases beside the general laws, he
mentions _common sense_ or _good judgment,_* which is our guide in
such like matters, as stated above (Q. 51, A. 4) in the treatise on
prudence: wherefore he says that it is a "voluntary justification,"
because by his own free will man observes what is just according to
his judgment and not according to the written law. [*St. Thomas
indicates the Greek derivation: _eugnomosyne_ quasi 'bona _gnome_.']
These two are ascribed to prudence as their director, and to justice
as their executor. _Eusebeia_ (piety) means _good worship_ and
consequently is the same as religion, wherefore he says that it is
the science of "the service of God" (he speaks after the manner of
Socrates who said that 'all the virtues are sciences') [*Aristotle,
_Ethic._ vi, 13]: and _holiness_ comes to the same, as we shall state
further on (Q. 81, A. 8). _Eucharistia_ (gratitude) means "good
thanksgiving," and is mentioned by Macrobius: wherefore Isidore says
(Etym. x) that "a kind man is one who is ready of his own accord to
do good, and is of gentle speech": and Andronicus too says that
"kindliness is a habit of voluntary beneficence." _Liberality_ would
seem to pertain to _humanity._
Reply Obj. 5: _Epieikeia_ is annexed, not to particular but to legal
justice, and apparently is the same as that which goes by the name of
_eugnomosyne_ (common sense).
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