THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 77, Art. 3]

Whether the Seller Is Bound to State the Defects of the Thing Sold?

Objection 1: It would seem that the seller is not bound to state the

defects of the thing sold. Since the seller does not bind the buyer

to buy, he would seem to leave it to him to judge of the goods

offered for sale. Now judgment about a thing and knowledge of that

thing belong to the same person. Therefore it does not seem imputable

to the seller if the buyer be deceived in his judgment, and be

hurried into buying a thing without carefully inquiring into its

condition.

Obj. 2: Further, it seems foolish for anyone to do what prevents him

carrying out his work. But if a man states the defects of the goods

he has for sale, he prevents their sale: wherefore Tully (De Offic.

iii, 13) pictures a man as saying: "Could anything be more absurd

than for a public crier, instructed by the owner, to cry: 'I offer

this unhealthy horse for sale?'" Therefore the seller is not bound to

state the defects of the thing sold.

Obj. 3: Further, man needs more to know the road of virtue than to

know the faults of things offered for sale. Now one is not bound to

offer advice to all or to tell them the truth about matters

pertaining to virtue, though one should not tell anyone what is

false. Much less therefore is a seller bound to tell the faults of

what he offers for sale, as though he were counseling the buyer.

Obj. 4: Further, if one were bound to tell the faults of what one

offers for sale, this would only be in order to lower the price. Now

sometimes the price would be lowered for some other reason, without

any defect in the thing sold: for instance, if the seller carry wheat

to a place where wheat fetches a high price, knowing that many will

come after him carrying wheat; because if the buyers knew this they

would give a lower price. But apparently the seller need not give the

buyer this information. Therefore, in like manner, neither need he

tell him the faults of the goods he is selling.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Offic. iii, 10): "In all

contracts the defects of the salable commodity must be stated; and

unless the seller make them known, although the buyer has already

acquired a right to them, the contract is voided on account of the

fraudulent action."

_I answer that,_ It is always unlawful to give anyone an occasion of

danger or loss, although a man need not always give another the help

or counsel which would be for his advantage in any way; but only in

certain fixed cases, for instance when someone is subject to him, or

when he is the only one who can assist him. Now the seller who offers

goods for sale, gives the buyer an occasion of loss or danger, by the

very fact that he offers him defective goods, if such defect may

occasion loss or danger to the buyer--loss, if, by reason of this

defect, the goods are of less value, and he takes nothing off the

price on that account--danger, if this defect either hinder the use

of the goods or render it hurtful, for instance, if a man sells a

lame for a fleet horse, a tottering house for a safe one, rotten or

poisonous food for wholesome. Wherefore if such like defects be

hidden, and the seller does not make them known, the sale will be

illicit and fraudulent, and the seller will be bound to compensation

for the loss incurred.

On the other hand, if the defect be manifest, for instance if a horse

have but one eye, or if the goods though useless to the buyer, be

useful to someone else, provided the seller take as much as he ought

from the price, he is not bound to state the defect of the goods,

since perhaps on account of that defect the buyer might want him to

allow a greater rebate than he need. Wherefore the seller may look to

his own indemnity, by withholding the defect of the goods.

Reply Obj. 1: Judgment cannot be pronounced save on what is manifest:

for "a man judges of what he knows" (Ethic. i, 3). Hence if the

defects of the goods offered for sale be hidden, judgment of them is

not sufficiently left with the buyer unless such defects be made

known to him. The case would be different if the defects were

manifest.

Reply Obj. 2: There is no need to publish beforehand by the public

crier the defects of the goods one is offering for sale, because if

he were to begin by announcing its defects, the bidders would be

frightened to buy, through ignorance of other qualities that might

render the thing good and serviceable. Such defect ought to be stated

to each individual that offers to buy: and then he will be able to

compare the various points one with the other, the good with the bad:

for nothing prevents that which is defective in one respect being

useful in many others.

Reply Obj. 3: Although a man is not bound strictly speaking to tell

everyone the truth about matters pertaining to virtue, yet he is so

bound in a case when, unless he tells the truth, his conduct would

endanger another man in detriment to virtue: and so it is in this

case.

Reply Obj. 4: The defect in a thing makes it of less value now than

it seems to be: but in the case cited, the goods are expected to be

of less value at a future time, on account of the arrival of other

merchants, which was not foreseen by the buyers. Wherefore the

seller, since he sells his goods at the price actually offered him,

does not seem to act contrary to justice through not stating what is

going to happen. If however he were to do so, or if he lowered his

price, it would be exceedingly virtuous on his part: although he does

not seem to be bound to do this as a debt of justice.

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 508 / 1128 题