Whether It Is Lawful to Sell a Thing for More Than Its Worth?
Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to sell a thing for more
than its worth. In the commutations of human life, civil laws
determine that which is just. Now according to these laws it is just
for buyer and seller to deceive one another (Cod. IV, xliv, De
Rescind. Vend. 8, 15): and this occurs by the seller selling a thing
for more than its worth, and the buyer buying a thing for less than
its worth. Therefore it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its
worth.
Obj. 2: Further, that which is common to all would seem to be natural
and not sinful. Now Augustine relates that the saying of a certain
jester was accepted by all, "You wish to buy for a song and to sell
at a premium," which agrees with the saying of Prov. 20:14, "It is
naught, it is naught, saith every buyer: and when he is gone away,
then he will boast." Therefore it is lawful to sell a thing for more
than its worth.
Obj. 3: Further, it does not seem unlawful if that which honesty
demands be done by mutual agreement. Now, according to the
Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13), in the friendship which is based on
utility, the amount of the recompense for a favor received should
depend on the utility accruing to the receiver: and this utility
sometimes is worth more than the thing given, for instance if the
receiver be in great need of that thing, whether for the purpose of
avoiding a danger, or of deriving some particular benefit. Therefore,
in contracts of buying and selling, it is lawful to give a thing in
return for more than its worth.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 7:12): "All things . . .
whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them."
But no man wishes to buy a thing for more than its worth. Therefore
no man should sell a thing to another man for more than its worth.
_I answer that,_ It is altogether sinful to have recourse to deceit
in order to sell a thing for more than its just price, because this
is to deceive one's neighbor so as to injure him. Hence Tully says
(De Offic. iii, 15): "Contracts should be entirely free from
double-dealing: the seller must not impose upon the bidder, nor the
buyer upon one that bids against him."
But, apart from fraud, we may speak of buying and selling in two
ways. First, as considered in themselves, and from this point of
view, buying and selling seem to be established for the common
advantage of both parties, one of whom requires that which belongs to
the other, and vice versa, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3).
Now whatever is established for the common advantage, should not be
more of a burden to one party than to another, and consequently all
contracts between them should observe equality of thing and thing.
Again, the quality of a thing that comes into human use is measured
by the price given for it, for which purpose money was invented, as
stated in _Ethic._ v, 5. Therefore if either the price exceed the
quantity of the thing's worth, or, conversely, the thing exceed the
price, there is no longer the equality of justice: and consequently,
to sell a thing for more than its worth, or to buy it for less than
its worth, is in itself unjust and unlawful.
Secondly we may speak of buying and selling, considered as
accidentally tending to the advantage of one party, and to the
disadvantage of the other: for instance, when a man has great need of
a certain thing, while another man will suffer if he be without it.
In such a case the just price will depend not only on the thing sold,
but on the loss which the sale brings on the seller. And thus it will
be lawful to sell a thing for more than it is worth in itself, though
the price paid be not more than it is worth to the owner. Yet if the
one man derive a great advantage by becoming possessed of the other
man's property, and the seller be not at a loss through being without
that thing, the latter ought not to raise the price, because the
advantage accruing to the buyer, is not due to the seller, but to a
circumstance affecting the buyer. Now no man should sell what is not
his, though he may charge for the loss he suffers.
On the other hand if a man find that he derives great advantage from
something he has bought, he may, of his own accord, pay the seller
something over and above: and this pertains to his honesty.
Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 2) human law is given
to the people among whom there are many lacking virtue, and it is not
given to the virtuous alone. Hence human law was unable to forbid all
that is contrary to virtue; and it suffices for it to prohibit
whatever is destructive of human intercourse, while it treats other
matters as though they were lawful, not by approving of them, but by
not punishing them. Accordingly, if without employing deceit the
seller disposes of his goods for more than their worth, or the buyer
obtain them for less than their worth, the law looks upon this as
licit, and provides no punishment for so doing, unless the excess be
too great, because then even human law demands restitution to be
made, for instance if a man be deceived in regard to more than half
the amount of the just price of a thing [*Cod. IV, xliv, De Rescind.
Vend. 2, 8].
On the other hand the Divine law leaves nothing unpunished that is
contrary to virtue. Hence, according to the Divine law, it is
reckoned unlawful if the equality of justice be not observed in
buying and selling: and he who has received more than he ought must
make compensation to him that has suffered loss, if the loss be
considerable. I add this condition, because the just price of things
is not fixed with mathematical precision, but depends on a kind of
estimate, so that a slight addition or subtraction would not seem to
destroy the equality of justice.
Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says "this jester, either by looking into
himself or by his experience of others, thought that all men are
inclined to wish to buy for a song and sell at a premium. But since
in reality this is wicked, it is in every man's power to acquire that
justice whereby he may resist and overcome this inclination." And
then he gives the example of a man who gave the just price for a book
to a man who through ignorance asked a low price for it. Hence it is
evident that this common desire is not from nature but from vice,
wherefore it is common to many who walk along the broad road of sin.
Reply Obj. 3: In commutative justice we consider chiefly real
equality. On the other hand, in friendship based on utility we
consider equality of usefulness, so that the recompense should depend
on the usefulness accruing, whereas in buying it should be equal to
the thing bought.
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