Whether Derision Is a Special Sin Distinct from Those Already
Mentioned?
Objection 1: It would seem that derision is not a special sin
distinct from those mentioned above. For laughing to scorn is
apparently the same as derision. But laughing to scorn pertains to
reviling. Therefore derision would seem not to differ from reviling.
Obj. 2: Further, no man is derided except for something reprehensible
which puts him to shame. Now such are sins; and if they be imputed to
a person publicly, it is a case of reviling, if privately, it amounts
to backbiting or tale-bearing. Therefore derision is not distinct
from the foregoing vices.
Obj. 3: Further, sins of this kind are distinguished by the injury
they inflict on one's neighbor. Now the injury inflicted on a man by
derision affects either his honor, or his good name, or is
detrimental to his friendship. Therefore derision is not a sin
distinct from the foregoing.
_On the contrary,_ Derision is done in jest, wherefore it is
described as "making fun." Now all the foregoing are done seriously
and not in jest. Therefore derision differs from all of them.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 72, A. 2), sins of word should
be weighed chiefly by the intention of the speaker, wherefore these
sins are differentiated according to the various intentions of those
who speak against another. Now just as the railer intends to injure
the honor of the person he rails, the backbiter to depreciate a good
name, and the tale-bearer to destroy friendship, so too the derider
intends to shame the person he derides. And since this end is
distinct from the others, it follows that the sin of derision is
distinct from the foregoing sins.
Reply Obj. 1: Laughing to scorn and derision agree as to the end but
differ in mode, because derision is done with the "mouth," i.e. by
words and laughter, while laughing to scorn is done by wrinkling the
nose, as a gloss says on Ps. 2:4, "He that dwelleth in heaven shall
laugh at them": and such a distinction does not differentiate the
species. Yet they both differ from reviling, as being shamed differs
from being dishonored: for to be ashamed is "to fear dishonor," as
Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 15).
Reply Obj. 2: For doing a virtuous deed a man deserves both respect
and a good name in the eyes of others, and in his own eyes the glory
of a good conscience, according to 2 Cor. 1:12, "Our glory is this,
the testimony of our conscience." Hence, on the other hand, for doing
a reprehensible, i.e. a vicious action, a man forfeits his honor and
good name in the eyes of others--and for this purpose the reviler and
the backbiter speak of another person--while in his own eyes, he
loses the glory of his conscience through being confused and ashamed
at reprehensible deeds being imputed to him--and for this purpose the
derider speaks ill of him. It is accordingly evident that derision
agrees with the foregoing vices as to the matter but differs as to
the end.
Reply Obj. 3: A secure and calm conscience is a great good, according
to Prov. 15:15, "A secure mind is like a continual feast." Wherefore
he that disturbs another's conscience by confounding him inflicts a
special injury on him: hence derision is a special kind of sin.
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