THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 71, Art. 3]

Whether an Advocate Sins by Defending an Unjust Cause?

Objection 1: It would seem that an advocate does not sin by defending

an unjust cause. For just as a physician proves his skill by healing

a desperate disease, so does an advocate prove his skill, if he can

defend an unjust cause. Now a physician is praised if he heals a

desperate malady. Therefore an advocate also commits no sin, but

ought to be praised, if he defends an unjust cause.

Obj. 2: Further, it is always lawful to desist from committing a sin.

Yet an advocate is punished if he throws up his brief (Decret. II,

qu. iii, can. Si quem poenit.). Therefore an advocate does not sin by

defending an unjust cause, when once he has undertaken its defense.

Obj. 3: Further, it would seem to be a greater sin for an advocate to

use unjust means in defense of a just cause (e.g. by producing false

witnesses, or alleging false laws), than to defend an unjust cause,

since the former is a sin against the form, the latter against the

matter of justice. Yet it is seemingly lawful for an advocate to make

use of such underhand means, even as it is lawful for a soldier to

lay ambushes in a battle. Therefore it would seem that an advocate

does not sin by defending an unjust cause.

_On the contrary,_ It is said (2 Paralip. 19:2): "Thou helpest the

ungodly . . . and therefore thou didst deserve . . . the wrath of the

Lord." Now an advocate by defending an unjust cause, helps the

ungodly. Therefore he sins and deserves the wrath of the Lord.

_I answer that,_ It is unlawful to cooperate in an evil deed, by

counseling, helping, or in any way consenting, because to counsel or

assist an action is, in a way, to do it, and the Apostle says (Rom.

1:32) that "they . . . are worthy of death, not only they that do" a

sin, "but they also that consent to them that do" it. Hence it was

stated above (Q. 62, A. 7), that all such are bound to restitution.

Now it is evident that an advocate provides both assistance and

counsel to the party for whom he pleads. Wherefore, if knowingly he

defends an unjust cause, without doubt he sins grievously, and is

bound to restitution of the loss unjustly incurred by the other party

by reason of the assistance he has provided. If, however, he defends

an unjust cause unknowingly, thinking it just, he is to be excused

according to the measure in which ignorance is excusable.

Reply Obj. 1: The physician injures no man by undertaking to heal a

desperate malady, whereas the advocate who accepts service in an

unjust cause, unjustly injures the party against whom he pleads

unjustly. Hence the comparison fails. For though he may seem to

deserve praise for showing skill in his art, nevertheless he sins by

reason of injustice in his will, since he abuses his art for an evil

end.

Reply Obj. 2: If an advocate believes from the outset that the cause

is just, and discovers afterwards while the case is proceeding that

it is unjust, he ought not to throw up his brief in such a way as to

help the other side, or so as to reveal the secrets of his client to

the other party. But he can and must give up the case, or induce his

client to give way, or make some compromise without prejudice to the

opposing party.

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 40, A. 3), it is lawful for a

soldier, or a general to lay ambushes in a just war, by prudently

concealing what he has a mind to do, but not by means of fraudulent

falsehoods, since we should keep faith even with a foe, as Tully says

(De offic. iii, 29). Hence it is lawful for an advocate, in defending

his case, prudently to conceal whatever might hinder its happy issue,

but it is unlawful for him to employ any kind of falsehood.

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 482 / 1128 题