THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 67, Art. 3]

Whether a Judge May Condemn a Man Who Is Not Accused?

Objection 1: It would seem that a judge may pass sentence on a man

who is not accused. For human justice is derived from Divine justice.

Now God judges the sinner even though there be no accuser. Therefore

it seems that a man may pass sentence of condemnation on a man even

though there be no accuser.

Obj. 2: Further, an accuser is required in judicial procedure in

order that he may relate the crime to the judge. Now sometimes the

crime may come to the judge's knowledge otherwise than by accusation;

for instance, by denunciation, or by evil report, or through the

judge himself being an eye-witness. Therefore a judge may condemn a

man without there being an accuser.

Obj. 3: Further, the deeds of holy persons are related in Holy Writ,

as models of human conduct. Now Daniel was at the same time the

accuser and the judge of the wicked ancients (Dan. 13). Therefore it

is not contrary to justice for a man to condemn anyone as judge while

being at the same time his accuser.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose in his commentary on 1 Cor. 5:2,

expounding the Apostle's sentence on the fornicator, says that "a

judge should not condemn without an accuser, since our Lord did not

banish Judas, who was a thief, yet was not accused."

_I answer that,_ A judge is an interpreter of justice. Wherefore, as

the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have recourse to a judge as

to one who is the personification of justice." Now, as stated above

(Q. 58, A. 2), justice is not between a man and himself but between

one man and another. Hence a judge must needs judge between two

parties, which is the case when one is the prosecutor, and the other

the defendant. Therefore in criminal cases the judge cannot sentence

a man unless the latter has an accuser, according to Acts 25:16: "It

is not the custom of the Romans to condemn any man, before that he

who is accused have his accusers present, and have liberty to make

his answer, to clear himself of the crimes" of which he is accused.

Reply Obj. 1: God, in judging man, takes the sinner's conscience as

his accuser, according to Rom. 2:15, "Their thoughts between

themselves accusing, or also defending one another"; or again, He

takes the evidence of the fact as regards the deed itself, according

to Gen. 4:10, "The voice of thy brother's blood crieth to Me from the

earth."

Reply Obj. 2: Public disgrace takes the place of an accuser. Hence a

gloss on Gen. 4:10, "The voice of thy brother's blood," etc. says:

"There is no need of an accuser when the crime committed is

notorious." In a case of denunciation, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 7),

the amendment, not the punishment, of the sinner is intended:

wherefore when a man is denounced for a sin, nothing is done against

him, but for him, so that no accuser is required. The punishment that

is inflicted is on account of his rebellion against the Church, and

since this rebellion is manifest, it stands instead of an accuser.

The fact that the judge himself was an eye-witness, does not

authorize him to proceed to pass sentence, except according to the

order of judicial procedure.

Reply Obj. 3: God, in judging man, proceeds from His own knowledge of

the truth, whereas man does not, as stated above (A. 2). Hence a man

cannot be accuser, witness and judge at the same time, as God is.

Daniel was at once accuser and judge, because he was the executor of

the sentence of God, by whose instinct he was moved, as stated above

(A. 1, ad 1).

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 462 / 1128 题