Whether a Man Can Justly Judge One Who Is Not Subject to His
Jurisdiction?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man can justly judge one who is not
subject to his jurisdiction. For it is stated (Dan. 13) that Daniel
sentenced the ancients who were convicted of bearing false witness.
But these ancients were not subject to Daniel; indeed they were
judges of the people. Therefore a man may lawfully judge one that is
not subject to his jurisdiction.
Obj. 2: Further, Christ was no man's subject, indeed He was "King of
kings and Lord of lords" (Apoc. 19:16). Yet He submitted to the
judgment of a man. Therefore it seems that a man may lawfully judge
one that is not subject to his jurisdiction.
Obj. 3: Further, according to the law [*Cap. Licet ratione, de Foro
Comp.] a man is tried in this or that court according to his kind of
offense. Now sometimes the defendant is not the subject of the man
whose business it is to judge in that particular place, for instance
when the defendant belongs to another diocese or is exempt. Therefore
it seems that a man may judge one that is not his subject.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory [*Regist. xi, epist. 64] in commenting on
Deut. 23:25, "If thou go into thy friend's corn," etc. says: "Thou
mayest not put the sickle of judgment to the corn that is entrusted
to another."
_I answer that,_ A judge's sentence is like a particular law
regarding some particular fact. Wherefore just as a general law
should have coercive power, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 9),
so too the sentence of a judge should have coercive power, whereby
either party is compelled to comply with the judge's sentence; else
the judgment would be of no effect. Now coercive power is not
exercised in human affairs, save by those who hold public authority:
and those who have this authority are accounted the superiors of
those over whom they preside whether by ordinary or by delegated
authority. Hence it is evident that no man can judge others than his
subjects and this in virtue either of delegated or of ordinary
authority.
Reply Obj. 1: In judging those ancients Daniel exercised an
authority delegated to him by Divine instinct. This is indicated where
it is said (Dan. 13:45) that "the Lord raised up the . . . spirit of a
young boy."
Reply Obj. 2: In human affairs a man may submit of his own accord to
the judgment of others although these be not his superiors, an
example of which is when parties agree to a settlement by
arbitrators. Wherefore it is necessary that the arbitrator should be
upheld by a penalty, since the arbitrators through not exercising
authority in the case, have not of themselves full power of coercion.
Accordingly in this way did Christ of his own accord submit to human
judgment: and thus too did Pope Leo [*Leo IV] submit to the judgment
of the emperor [*Can. Nos si incompetenter, caus. ii, qu. 7].
Reply Obj. 3: The bishop of the defendant's diocese becomes
the latter's superior as regards the fault committed, even though he
be exempt: unless perchance the defendant offend in a matter exempt
from the bishop's authority, for instance in administering the
property of an exempt monastery. But if an exempt person commits a
theft, or a murder or the like, he may be justly condemned by the
ordinary.
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