EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 8]

Whether One Is Guilty of Murder Through Killing Someone by Chance?

Objection 1: It would seem that one is guilty of murder through

killing someone by chance. For we read (Gen. 4:23, 24) that Lamech

slew a man in mistake for a wild beast [*The text of the Bible does

not say so, but this was the Jewish traditional commentary on Gen.

4:23], and that he was accounted guilty of murder. Therefore one

incurs the guilt of murder through killing a man by chance.

Obj. 2: Further, it is written (Ex. 21:22): "If . . . one strike a

woman with child, and she miscarry indeed . . . if her death ensue

thereupon, he shall render life for life." Yet this may happen

without any intention of causing her death. Therefore one is guilty

of murder through killing someone by chance.

Obj. 3: Further, the Decretals [*Dist. 1] contain several canons

prescribing penalties for unintentional homicide. Now penalty is not

due save for guilt. Therefore he who kills a man by chance, incurs

the guilt of murder.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): "When we

do a thing for a good and lawful purpose, if thereby we

unintentionally cause harm to anyone, it should by no means be

imputed to us." Now it sometimes happens by chance that a person is

killed as a result of something done for a good purpose. Therefore

the person who did it is not accounted guilty.

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 6) "chance

is a cause that acts beside one's intention." Hence chance

happenings, strictly speaking, are neither intended nor voluntary.

And since every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De Vera

Relig. xiv) it follows that chance happenings, as such, are not sins.

Nevertheless it happens that what is not actually and directly

voluntary and intended, is voluntary and intended accidentally,

according as that which removes an obstacle is called an accidental

cause. Wherefore he who does not remove something whence homicide

results whereas he ought to remove it, is in a sense guilty of

voluntary homicide. This happens in two ways: first when a man causes

another's death through occupying himself with unlawful things which

he ought to avoid: secondly, when he does not take sufficient care.

Hence, according to jurists, if a man pursue a lawful occupation and

take due care, the result being that a person loses his life, he is

not guilty of that person's death: whereas if he be occupied with

something unlawful, or even with something lawful, but without due

care, he does not escape being guilty of murder, if his action

results in someone's death.

Reply Obj. 1: Lamech did not take sufficient care to avoid taking a

man's life: and so he was not excused from being guilty of homicide.

Reply Obj. 2: He that strikes a woman with child does something

unlawful: wherefore if there results the death either of the woman or

of the animated fetus, he will not be excused from homicide,

especially seeing that death is the natural result of such a blow.

Reply Obj. 3: According to the canons a penalty is inflicted on those

who cause death unintentionally, through doing something unlawful, or

failing to take sufficient care.

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 443 / 1128 题