Whether a Man Is Bound to Immediate Restitution, or May He Put It Off?
Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to immediate
restitution, and can lawfully delay to restore. For affirmative
precepts do not bind for always. Now the necessity of making
restitution is binding through an affirmative precept. Therefore a
man is not bound to immediate restitution.
Obj. 2: Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible. But it is
sometimes impossible to make restitution at once. Therefore no man is
bound to immediate restitution.
Obj. 3: Further, restitution is an act of virtue, viz. of justice.
Now time is one of the circumstances requisite for virtuous acts.
Since then the other circumstances are not determinate for acts of
virtue, but are determinable according to the dictate of prudence, it
seems that neither in restitution is there any fixed time, so that a
man be bound to restore at once.
_On the contrary,_ All matters of restitution seem to come under one
head. Now a man who hires the services of a wage-earner, must not
delay compensation, as appears from Lev. 19:13, "The wages of him
that hath been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until the
morning." Therefore neither is it lawful, in other cases of
restitution, to delay, and restitution should be made at once.
_I answer that,_ Even as it is a sin against justice to take
another's property, so also is it to withhold it, since, to withhold
the property of another against the owner's will, is to deprive him
of the use of what belongs to him, and to do him an injury. Now it is
clear that it is wrong to remain in sin even for a short time; and
one is bound to renounce one's sin at once, according to Ecclus.
21:2, "Flee from sin as from the face of a serpent." Consequently one
is bound to immediate restitution, if possible, or to ask for a
respite from the person who is empowered to grant the use of the
thing.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the precept about the making of restitution is
affirmative in form, it implies a negative precept forbidding us to
withhold another's property.
Reply Obj. 2: When one is unable to restore at once, this very
inability excuses one from immediate restitution: even as a person is
altogether excused from making restitution if he is altogether unable
to make it. He is, however, bound either himself or through another
to ask the person to whom he owes compensation to grant him a
remission or a respite.
Reply Obj. 3: Whenever the omission of a circumstance is contrary to
virtue that circumstance must be looked upon as determinate, and we
are bound to observe it: and since delay of restitution involves a
sin of unjust detention which is opposed to just detention, it stands
to reason that the time is determinate in the point of restitution
being immediate.
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