Whether He That Has Taken a Thing Is Always Bound to Restitution?
Objection 1: It would seem that he who has taken a thing is not
always bound to restore it. Restitution re-establishes the equality
of justice, by taking away from him that has more and giving to him
that has less. Now it happens sometimes that he who has taken that
which belongs to another, no longer has it, through its having passed
into another's hands. Therefore it should be restored, not by the
person that took it, but by the one that has it.
Obj. 2: Further, no man is bound to reveal his own crime. But by
making restitution a man would sometimes reveal his crime, as in the
case of theft. Therefore he that has taken a thing is not always
bound to restitution.
Obj. 3: Further, the same thing should not be restored several times.
Now sometimes several persons take a thing at the same time, and one
of them restores it in its entirety. Therefore he that takes a thing
is not always bound to restitution.
_On the contrary,_ He that has sinned is bound to satisfaction. Now
restitution belongs to satisfaction. Therefore he that has taken a
thing is bound to restore it.
_I answer that,_ With regard to a man who has taken another's
property, two points must be considered: the thing taken, and the
taking. By reason of the thing taken, he is bound to restore it as
long as he has it in his possession, since the thing that he has in
addition to what is his, should be taken away from him, and given to
him who lacks it according to the form of commutative justice. On the
other hand, the taking of the thing that is another's property, may
be threefold. For sometimes it is injurious, i.e. against the will of
the owner, as in theft and robbery: in which case the thief is bound
to restitution not only by reason of the thing, but also by reason of
the injurious action, even though the thing is no longer in his
possession. For just as a man who strikes another, though he gain
nothing thereby, is bound to compensate the injured person, so too he
that is guilty of theft or robbery, is bound to make compensation for
the loss incurred, although he be no better off; and in addition he
must be punished for the injustice committed. Secondly, a man takes
another's property for his own profit but without committing an
injury, i.e. with the consent of the owner, as in the case of a loan:
and then, the taker is bound to restitution, not only by reason of
the thing, but also by reason of the taking, even if he has lost the
thing: for he is bound to compensate the person who has done him a
favor, and he would not be doing so if the latter were to lose
thereby. Thirdly, a man takes another's property without injury to
the latter or profit to himself, as in the case of a deposit;
wherefore he that takes a thing thus, incurs no obligation on account
of the taking, in fact by taking he grants a favor; but he is bound
to restitution on account of the thing taken. Consequently if this
thing be taken from him without any fault on his part, he is not
bound to restitution, although he would be, if he were to lose the
thing through a grievous fault on his part.
Reply Obj. 1: The chief end of restitution is, not that he who has
more than his due may cease to have it, but that he who has less than
his due may be compensated. Wherefore there is no place for
restitution in those things which one man may receive from another
without loss to the latter, as when a person takes a light from
another's candle. Consequently although he that has taken something
from another, may have ceased to have what he took, through having
transferred it to another, yet since that other is deprived of what
is his, both are bound to restitution, he that took the thing, on
account of the injurious taking, and he that has it, on account of
the thing.
Reply Obj. 2: Although a man is not bound to reveal his crime to
other men, yet is he bound to reveal it to God in confession; and so
he may make restitution of another's property through the priest to
whom he confesses.
Reply Obj. 3: Since restitution is chiefly directed to the
compensation for the loss incurred by the person from whom a thing
has been taken unjustly, it stands to reason that when he has
received sufficient compensation from one, the others are not bound
to any further restitution in his regard: rather ought they to refund
the person who has made restitution, who, nevertheless, may excuse
them from so doing.
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