FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 62, Art. 1]

Whether Restitution Is an Act of Commutative Justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that restitution is not an act of

commutative justice. For justice regards the notion of what is due.

Now one may restore, even as one may give, that which is not due.

Therefore restitution is not the act of any part of justice.

Obj. 2: Further, that which has passed away and is no more cannot be

restored. Now justice and injustice are about certain actions and

passions, which are unenduring and transitory. Therefore restitution

would not seem to be the act of a part of justice.

Obj. 3: Further, restitution is repayment of something taken away.

Now something may be taken away from a man not only in commutation,

but also in distribution, as when, in distributing, one gives a man

less than his due. Therefore restitution is not more an act of

commutative than of distributive justice.

_On the contrary,_ Restitution is opposed to taking away. Now it is

an act of commutative injustice to take away what belongs to another.

Therefore to restore it is an act of that justice which directs

commutations.

_I answer that,_ To restore is seemingly the same as to reinstate a

person in the possession or dominion of his thing, so that in

restitution we consider the equality of justice attending the payment

of one thing for another, and this belongs to commutative justice.

Hence restitution is an act of commutative justice, occasioned by one

person having what belongs to another, either with his consent, for

instance on loan or deposit, or against his will, as in robbery or

theft.

Reply Obj. 1: That which is not due to another is not his properly

speaking, although it may have been his at some time: wherefore it is

a mere gift rather than a restitution, when anyone renders to another

what is not due to him. It is however somewhat like a restitution,

since the thing itself is materially the same; yet it is not the same

in respect of the formal aspect of justice, which considers that

thing as belonging to this particular man: and so it is not

restitution properly so called.

Reply Obj. 2: In so far as the word restitution denotes something

done over again, it implies identity of object. Hence it would seem

originally to have applied chiefly to external things, which can pass

from one person to another, since they remain the same both

substantially and in respect of the right of dominion. But, even as

the term "commutation" has passed from such like things to those

actions and passions which confer reverence or injury, harm or profit

on another person, so too the term "restitution" is applied, to

things which though they be transitory in reality, yet remain in

their effect; whether this touch his body, as when the body is hurt

by being struck, or his reputation, as when a man remains defamed or

dishonored by injurious words.

Reply Obj. 3: Compensation is made by the distributor to the man to

whom less was given than his due, by comparison of thing with thing,

when the latter receives so much the more according as he received

less than his due: and consequently it pertains to commutative

justice.

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 422 / 1128 题