Whether the Just Is Absolutely the Same As Retaliation?
Objection 1: It would seem that the just is absolutely the same as
retaliation. For the judgment of God is absolutely just. Now the
judgment of God is such that a man has to suffer in proportion with
his deeds, according to Matt. 7:2: "With what measure you judge, you
shall be judged: and with what measure you mete, it shall be measured
to you again." Therefore the just is absolutely the same as
retaliation.
Obj. 2: Further, in either kind of justice something is given to
someone according to a kind of equality. In distributive justice this
equality regards personal dignity, which would seem to depend chiefly
on what a person has done for the good of the community; while in
commutative justice it regards the thing in which a person has
suffered loss. Now in respect of either equality there is retaliation
in respect of the deed committed. Therefore it would seem that the
just is absolutely the same as retaliation.
Obj. 3: Further, the chief argument against retaliation is based on
the difference between the voluntary and the involuntary; for he who
does an injury involuntarily is less severely punished. Now voluntary
and involuntary taken in relation to ourselves, do not diversify the
mean of justice since this is the real mean and does not depend on
us. Therefore it would seem that the just is absolutely the same as
retaliation.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher proves (Ethic. v, 5) that the just
is not always the same as retaliation.
_I answer that,_ Retaliation (_contrapassum_) denotes equal passion
repaid for previous action; and the expression applies most properly
to injurious passions and actions, whereby a man harms the person of
his neighbor; for instance if a man strike, that he be struck back.
This kind of just is laid down in the Law (Ex. 21:23, 24): "He shall
render life for life, eye for eye," etc. And since also to take away
what belongs to another is to do an unjust thing, it follows that
secondly retaliation consists in this also, that whosoever causes
loss to another, should suffer loss in his belongings. This just loss
is also found in the Law (Ex. 22:1): "If any man steal an ox or a
sheep, and kill or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for one ox and
four sheep for one sheep." Thirdly retaliation is transferred to
voluntary commutations, where action and passion are on both sides,
although voluntariness detracts from the nature of passion, as stated
above (Q. 59, A. 3).
In all these cases, however, repayment must be made on a basis of
equality according to the requirements of commutative justice, namely
that the meed of passion be equal to the action. Now there would not
always be equality if passion were in the same species as the action.
Because, in the first place, when a person injures the person of one
who is greater, the action surpasses any passion of the same species
that he might undergo, wherefore he that strikes a prince, is not
only struck back, but is much more severely punished. In like manner
when a man despoils another of his property against the latter's
will, the action surpasses the passion if he be merely deprived of
that thing, because the man who caused another's loss, himself would
lose nothing, and so he is punished by making restitution several
times over, because not only did he injure a private individual, but
also the common weal, the security of whose protection he has
infringed. Nor again would there be equality of passion in voluntary
commutations, were one always to exchange one's chattel for another
man's, because it might happen that the other man's chattel is much
greater than our own: so that it becomes necessary to equalize
passion and action in commutations according to a certain
proportionate commensuration, for which purpose money was invented.
Hence retaliation is in accordance with commutative justice: but
there is no place for it in distributive justice, because in
distributive justice we do not consider the equality between thing
and thing or between passion and action (whence the expression
_contrapassum_), but according to proportion between things and
persons, as stated above (A. 2).
Reply Obj. 1: This form of the Divine judgment is in accordance with
the conditions of commutative justice, in so far as rewards are
apportioned to merits, and punishments to sins.
Reply Obj. 2: When a man who has served the community is paid for his
services, this is to be referred to commutative, not distributive,
justice. Because distributive justice considers the equality, not
between the thing received and the thing done, but between the thing
received by one person and the thing received by another according to
the respective conditions of those persons.
Reply Obj. 3: When the injurious action is voluntary, the injury is
aggravated and consequently is considered as a greater thing. Hence
it requires a greater punishment in repayment, by reason of a
difference, not on our part, but on the part of the thing.
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