Whether Two Species of Justice Are Suitably Assigned, Viz.
Commutative and Distributive?
Objection 1: It would seem that the two species of justice are
unsuitably assigned, viz. distributive and commutative. That which is
hurtful to the many cannot be a species of justice, since justice is
directed to the common good. Now it is hurtful to the common good of
the many, if the goods of the community are distributed among many,
both because the goods of the community would be exhausted, and
because the morals of men would be corrupted. For Tully says (De
Offic. ii, 15): "He who receives becomes worse, and the more ready to
expect that he will receive again." Therefore distribution does not
belong to any species of justice.
Obj. 2: Further, the act of justice is to render to each one what is
his own, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 2). But when things are
distributed, a man does not receive what was his, but becomes
possessed of something which belonged to the community. Therefore
this does not pertain to justice.
Obj. 3: Further, justice is not only in the sovereign, but also in
the subject, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 6). But it belongs
exclusively to the sovereign to distribute. Therefore distribution
does not always belong to justice.
Obj. 4: Further, "Distributive justice regards common goods" (Ethic.
v, 4). Now matters regarding the community pertain to legal justice.
Therefore distributive justice is a part, not of particular, but of
legal justice.
Obj. 5: Further, unity or multitude do not change the species of a
virtue. Now commutative justice consists in rendering something to
one person, while distributive justice consists in giving something
to many. Therefore they are not different species of justice.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher assigns two parts to justice and
says (Ethic. v, 2) that "one directs distributions, the other,
commutations."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 58, AA. 7, 8), particular
justice is directed to the private individual, who is compared to the
community as a part to the whole. Now a twofold order may be
considered in relation to a part. In the first place there is the
order of one part to another, to which corresponds the order of one
private individual to another. This order is directed by commutative
justice, which is concerned about the mutual dealings between two
persons. In the second place there is the order of the whole towards
the parts, to which corresponds the order of that which belongs to
the community in relation to each single person. This order is
directed by distributive justice, which distributes common goods
proportionately. Hence there are two species of justice, distributive
and commutative.
Reply Obj. 1: Just as a private individual is praised for moderation
in his bounty, and blamed for excess therein, so too ought moderation
to be observed in the distribution of common goods, wherein
distributive justice directs.
Reply Obj. 2: Even as part and whole are somewhat the same, so too
that which pertains to the whole, pertains somewhat to the part also:
so that when the goods of the community are distributed among a
number of individuals each one receives that which, in a way, is his
own.
Reply Obj. 3: The act of distributing the goods of the community,
belongs to none but those who exercise authority over those goods;
and yet distributive justice is also in the subjects to whom those
goods are distributed in so far as they are contented by a just
distribution. Moreover distribution of common goods is sometimes made
not to the state but to the members of a family, and such
distribution can be made by authority of a private individual.
Reply Obj. 4: Movement takes its species from the term
_whereunto._ Hence it belongs to legal justice to direct to the common
good those matters which concern private individuals: whereas on the
contrary it belongs to particular justice to direct the common good to
particular individuals by way of distribution.
Reply Obj. 5: Distributive and commutative justice differ not
only in respect of unity and multitude, but also in respect of
different kinds of due: because common property is due to an
individual in one way, and his personal property in another way.
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