Whether Judgment Is Rendered Perverse by Being Usurped?
Objection 1: It would seem that judgment is not rendered perverse by
being usurped. For justice is rectitude in matters of action. Now
truth is not impaired, no matter who tells it, but it may suffer from
the person who ought to accept it. Therefore again justice loses
nothing, no matter who declares what is just, and this is what is
meant by judgment.
Obj. 2: Further, it belongs to judgment to punish sins. Now it is
related to the praise of some that they punished sins without having
authority over those whom they punished; such as Moses in slaying the
Egyptian (Ex. 2:12), and Phinees the son of Eleazar in slaying Zambri
the son of Salu (Num. 25:7-14), and "it was reputed to him unto
justice" (Ps. 105:31). Therefore usurpation of judgment pertains not
to injustice.
Obj. 3: Further, spiritual power is distinct from temporal. Now
prelates having spiritual power sometimes interfere in matters
concerning the secular power. Therefore usurped judgment is not
unlawful.
Obj. 4: Further, even as the judge requires authority in order to
judge aright, so also does he need justice and knowledge, as shown
above (A. 1, ad 1, 3; A. 2). But a judgment is not described as
unjust, if he who judges lacks the habit of justice or the knowledge
of the law. Neither therefore is it always unjust to judge by
usurpation, i.e. without authority.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 14:4): "Who art thou that
judgest another man's servant?"
_I answer that,_ Since judgment should be pronounced according to the
written law, as stated above (A. 5), he that pronounces judgment,
interprets, in a way, the letter of the law, by applying it to some
particular case. Now since it belongs to the same authority to
interpret and to make a law, just as a law cannot be made save by
public authority, so neither can a judgment be pronounced except by
public authority, which extends over those who are subject to the
community. Wherefore even as it would be unjust for one man to force
another to observe a law that was not approved by public authority,
so too it is unjust, if a man compels another to submit to a judgment
that is pronounced by other than the public authority.
Reply Obj. 1: When the truth is declared there is no obligation to
accept it, and each one is free to receive it or not, as he wishes.
On the other hand judgment implies an obligation, wherefore it is
unjust for anyone to be judged by one who has no public authority.
Reply Obj. 2: Moses seems to have slain the Egyptian by authority
received as it were, by divine inspiration; this seems to follow from
Acts 7:24, 25, where it is said that "striking the Egyptian . . . he
thought that his brethren understood that God by his hand would save
Israel [Vulg.: 'them']." Or it may be replied that Moses slew the
Egyptian in order to defend the man who was unjustly attacked,
without himself exceeding the limits of a blameless defence.
Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 36) that "whoever does not ward
off a blow from a fellow man when he can, is as much in fault as the
striker"; and he quotes the example of Moses. Again we may reply with
Augustine (QQ. Exod. qu. 2) [*Cf. Contra Faust. xxii, 70] that just
as "the soil gives proof of its fertility by producing useless herbs
before the useful seeds have grown, so this deed of Moses was sinful
although it gave a sign of great fertility," in so far, to wit, as it
was a sign of the power whereby he was to deliver his people.
With regard to Phinees the reply is that he did this out of zeal for
God by Divine inspiration; or because though not as yet high-priest,
he was nevertheless the high-priest's son, and this judgment was his
concern as of the other judges, to whom this was commanded [*Ex.
22:20; Lev. 20; Deut. 13, 17].
Reply Obj. 3: The secular power is subject to the spiritual, even as
the body is subject to the soul. Consequently the judgment is not
usurped if the spiritual authority interferes in those temporal
matters that are subject to the spiritual authority or which have
been committed to the spiritual by the temporal authority.
Reply Obj. 4: The habits of knowledge and justice are perfections of
the individual, and consequently their absence does not make a
judgment to be usurped, as in the absence of public authority which
gives a judgment its coercive force.
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