Whether Justice Stands Foremost Among All Moral Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that justice does not stand foremost among
all the moral virtues. Because it belongs to justice to render to
each one what is his, whereas it belongs to liberality to give of
one's own, and this is more virtuous. Therefore liberality is a
greater virtue than justice.
Obj. 2: Further, nothing is adorned by a less excellent thing than
itself. Now magnanimity is the ornament both of justice and of all
the virtues, according to _Ethic._ iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is
more excellent than justice.
Obj. 3: Further, virtue is about that which is "difficult" and
"good," as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3. But fortitude is about more
difficult things than justice is, since it is about dangers of death,
according to _Ethic._ iii, 6. Therefore fortitude is more excellent
than justice.
_On the contrary,_ Tully says (De Offic. i, 7): "Justice is the most
resplendent of the virtues, and gives its name to a good man."
_I answer that,_ If we speak of legal justice, it is evident that it
stands foremost among all the moral virtues, for as much as the
common good transcends the individual good of one person. In this
sense the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that "the most excellent
of the virtues would seem to be justice, and more glorious than
either the evening or the morning star." But, even if we speak of
particular justice, it excels the other moral virtues for two
reasons. The first reason may be taken from the subject, because
justice is in the more excellent part of the soul, viz. the rational
appetite or will, whereas the other moral virtues are in the
sensitive appetite, whereunto appertain the passions which are the
matter of the other moral virtues. The second reason is taken from
the object, because the other virtues are commendable in respect of
the sole good of the virtuous person himself, whereas justice is
praiseworthy in respect of the virtuous person being well disposed
towards another, so that justice is somewhat the good of another
person, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 1. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet.
i, 9): "The greatest virtues must needs be those which are most
profitable to other persons, because virtue is a faculty of doing
good to others. For this reason the greatest honors are accorded the
brave and the just, since bravery is useful to others in warfare, and
justice is useful to others both in warfare and in time of peace."
Reply Obj. 1: Although the liberal man gives of his own, yet he does
so in so far as he takes into consideration the good of his own
virtue, while the just man gives to another what is his, through
consideration of the common good. Moreover justice is observed
towards all, whereas liberality cannot extend to all. Again
liberality which gives of a man's own is based on justice, whereby
one renders to each man what is his.
Reply Obj. 2: When magnanimity is added to justice it increases the
latter's goodness; and yet without justice it would not even be a
virtue.
Reply Obj. 3: Although fortitude is about the most difficult things,
it is not about the best, for it is only useful in warfare, whereas
justice is useful both in war and in peace, as stated above.
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