Whether the Mean of Justice Is the Real Mean?
Objection 1: It would seem that the mean of justice is not the real
mean. For the generic nature remains entire in each species. Now
moral virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) to be "an elective habit which
observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason." Therefore justice
observes the rational and not the real mean.
Obj. 2: Further, in things that are good simply, there is neither
excess nor defect, and consequently neither is there a mean; as is
clearly the case with the virtues, according to _Ethic._ ii, 6. Now
justice is about things that are good simply, as stated in _Ethic._
v. Therefore justice does not observe the real mean.
Obj. 3: Further, the reason why the other virtues are said to observe
the rational and not the real mean, is because in their case the mean
varies according to different persons, since what is too much for one
is too little for another (Ethic. ii, 6). Now this is also the case
in justice: for one who strikes a prince does not receive the same
punishment as one who strikes a private individual. Therefore justice
also observes, not the real, but the rational mean.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6; v, 4) that the
mean of justice is to be taken according to "arithmetical"
proportion, so that it is the real mean.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 9; I-II, Q. 59, A. 4), the other
moral virtues are chiefly concerned with the passions, the regulation
of which is gauged entirely by a comparison with the very man who is
the subject of those passions, in so far as his anger and desire are
vested with their various due circumstances. Hence the mean in such
like virtues is measured not by the proportion of one thing to
another, but merely by comparison with the virtuous man himself, so
that with them the mean is only that which is fixed by reason in our
regard.
On the other hand, the matter of justice is external operation, in so
far as an operation or the thing used in that operation is duly
proportionate to another person, wherefore the mean of justice
consists in a certain proportion of equality between the external
thing and the external person. Now equality is the real mean between
greater and less, as stated in _Metaph._ x [*Didot ed., ix, 5; Cf.
_Ethic._ v, 4]: wherefore justice observes the real mean.
Reply Obj. 1: This real mean is also the rational mean, wherefore
justice satisfies the conditions of a moral virtue.
Reply Obj. 2: We may speak of a thing being good simply in two ways.
First a thing may be good in every way: thus the virtues are good;
and there is neither mean nor extremes in things that are good simply
in this sense. Secondly a thing is said to be good simply through
being good absolutely i.e. in its nature, although it may become evil
through being abused. Such are riches and honors; and in the like it
is possible to find excess, deficiency and mean, as regards men who
can use them well or ill: and it is in this sense that justice is
about things that are good simply.
Reply Obj. 3: The injury inflicted bears a different proportion to a
prince from that which it bears to a private person: wherefore each
injury requires to be equalized by vengeance in a different way: and
this implies a real and not merely a rational diversity.
_______________________