Whether _Euboulia_ Is a Virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that _euboulia_ is not a virtue. For,
according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18, 19) "no man makes evil
use of virtue." Now some make evil use of _euboulia_ or good counsel,
either through devising crafty counsels in order to achieve evil
ends, or through committing sin in order that they may achieve good
ends, as those who rob that they may give alms. Therefore _euboulia_
is not a virtue.
Obj. 2: Further, virtue is a perfection, according to _Phys._ vii.
But _euboulia_ is concerned with counsel, which implies doubt and
research, and these are marks of imperfection. Therefore _euboulia_
is not a virtue.
Obj. 3: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated
above (I-II, Q. 65). Now _euboulia_ is not connected with the other
virtues, since many sinners take good-counsel, and many godly men are
slow in taking counsel. Therefore _euboulia_ is not a virtue.
_On the contrary,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9)
_euboulia_ "is a right counselling." Now the perfection of virtue
consists in right reason. Therefore _euboulia_ is a virtue.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, A. 4) the nature of a human
virtue consists in making a human act good. Now among the acts of
man, it is proper to him to take counsel, since this denotes a
research of the reason about the actions he has to perform and
whereof human life consists, for the speculative life is above man,
as stated in _Ethic._ x. But _euboulia_ signifies goodness of
counsel, for it is derived from the _eu_, good, and _boule_, counsel,
being "a good counsel" or rather "a disposition to take good
counsel." Hence it is evident that _euboulia_ is a human virtue.
Reply Obj. 1: There is no good counsel either in deliberating for an
evil end, or in discovering evil means for attaining a good end, even
as in speculative matters, there is no good reasoning either in
coming to a false conclusion, or in coming to a true conclusion from
false premisses through employing an unsuitable middle term. Hence
both the aforesaid processes are contrary to _euboulia,_ as the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9).
Reply Obj. 2: Although virtue is essentially a perfection, it does
not follow that whatever is the matter of a virtue implies
perfection. For man needs to be perfected by virtues in all his
parts, and this not only as regards the acts of reason, of which
counsel is one, but also as regards the passions of the sensitive
appetite, which are still more imperfect.
It may also be replied that human virtue is a perfection according to
the mode of man, who is unable by simple insight to comprehend with
certainty the truth of things, especially in matters of action which
are contingent.
Reply Obj. 3: In no sinner as such is _euboulia_ to be found: since
all sin is contrary to taking good counsel. For good counsel requires
not only the discovery or devising of fit means for the end, but also
other circumstances. Such are suitable time, so that one be neither
too slow nor too quick in taking counsel, and the mode of taking
counsel, so that one be firm in the counsel taken, and other like due
circumstances, which sinners fail to observe when they sin. On the
other hand, every virtuous man takes good counsel in those things
which are directed to the end of virtue, although perhaps he does not
take good counsel in other particular matters, for instance in
matters of trade, or warfare, or the like.
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