Whether a Species of Prudence Is Regnative?
Objection 1: It would seem that regnative should not be reckoned a
species of prudence. For regnative prudence is directed to the
preservation of justice, since according to _Ethic._ v, 6 the prince
is the guardian of justice. Therefore regnative prudence belongs to
justice rather than to prudence.
Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 5) a
kingdom (_regnum_) is one of six species of government. But no
species of prudence is ascribed to the other five forms of
government, which are "aristocracy," "polity," also called
"timocracy" [*Cf. _Ethic._ viii, 10], "tyranny," "oligarchy" and
"democracy." Therefore neither should a regnative species be ascribed
to a kingdom.
Obj. 3: Further, lawgiving belongs not only to kings, but also to
certain others placed in authority, and even to the people, according
to Isidore (Etym. v). Now the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) reckons a
part of prudence to be "legislative." Therefore it is not becoming to
substitute regnative prudence in its place.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 11) that
"prudence is a virtue which is proper to the prince." Therefore a
special kind of prudence is regnative.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 47, AA. 8, 10), it belongs to
prudence to govern and command, so that wherever in human acts we
find a special kind of governance and command, there must be a
special kind of prudence. Now it is evident that there is a special
and perfect kind of governance in one who has to govern not only
himself but also the perfect community of a city or kingdom; because
a government is the more perfect according as it is more universal,
extends to more matters, and attains a higher end. Hence prudence in
its special and most perfect sense, belongs to a king who is charged
with the government of a city or kingdom: for which reason a species
of prudence is reckoned to be regnative.
Reply Obj. 1: All matters connected with moral virtue belong to
prudence as their guide, wherefore "right reason in accord with
prudence" is included in the definition of moral virtue, as stated
above (Q. 47, A. 5, ad 1; I-II, Q. 58, A. 2, ad 4). For this reason
also the execution of justice in so far as it is directed to the
common good, which is part of the kingly office, needs the guidance
of prudence. Hence these two virtues--prudence and justice--belong
most properly to a king, according to Jer. 23:5: "A king shall reign
and shall be wise, and shall execute justice and judgment in the
earth." Since, however, direction belongs rather to the king, and
execution to his subjects, regnative prudence is reckoned a species
of prudence which is directive, rather than to justice which is
executive.
Reply Obj. 2: A kingdom is the best of all governments, as stated in
_Ethic._ viii, 10: wherefore the species of prudence should be
denominated rather from a kingdom, yet so as to comprehend under
regnative all other rightful forms of government, but not perverse
forms which are opposed to virtue, and which, accordingly, do not
pertain to prudence.
Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher names regnative prudence after the
principal act of a king which is to make laws, and although this
applies to the other forms of government, this is only in so far as
they have a share of kingly government.
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