Whether Three Parts of Prudence Are Fittingly Assigned?
Objection 1: It would seem that the parts of prudence are assigned
unfittingly. Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) assigns three parts of
prudence, namely, "memory," "understanding" and "foresight."
Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i) following the opinion of Plotinus
ascribes to prudence six parts, namely, "reasoning," "understanding,"
"circumspection," "foresight," "docility" and "caution." Aristotle
says (Ethic. vi, 9, 10, 11) that "good counsel," "synesis" and
"gnome" belong to prudence. Again under the head of prudence he
mentions "conjecture," "shrewdness," "sense" and "understanding." And
another Greek philosopher [*Andronicus; Cf. Q. 80, Obj. 4] says that
ten things are connected with prudence, namely, "good counsel,"
"shrewdness," "foresight," "regnative [*Regnativa]," "military,"
"political" and "domestic prudence," "dialectics," "rhetoric" and
"physics." Therefore it seems that one or the other enumeration is
either excessive or deficient.
Obj. 2: Further, prudence is specifically distinct from science. But
politics, economics, logic, rhetoric, physics are sciences. Therefore
they are not parts of prudence.
Obj. 3: Further, the parts do not exceed the whole. Now the
intellective memory or intelligence, reason, sense and docility,
belong not only to prudence but also to all the cognitive habits.
Therefore they should not be set down as parts of prudence.
Obj. 4: Further, just as counselling, judging and commanding are acts
of the practical reason, so also is using, as stated above (I-II, Q.
16, A. 1). Therefore, just as "eubulia" which refers to counsel, is
connected with prudence, and "synesis" and "gnome" which refer to
judgment, so also ought something to have been assigned corresponding
to use.
Obj. 5: Further, solicitude pertains to prudence, as stated above (Q.
47, A. 9). Therefore solicitude also should have been mentioned among
the parts of prudence.
_I answer that,_ Parts are of three kinds, namely, _integral,_ as
wall, roof, and foundations are parts of a house; _subjective,_ as ox
and lion are parts of animal; and _potential,_ as the nutritive and
sensitive powers are parts of the soul. Accordingly, parts can be
assigned to a virtue in three ways. First, in likeness to integral
parts, so that the things which need to concur for the perfect act of
a virtue, are called the parts of that virtue. In this way, out of
all the things mentioned above, eight may be taken as parts of
prudence, namely, the six assigned by Macrobius; with the addition of
a seventh, viz. _memory_ mentioned by Tully; and _eustochia_ or
_shrewdness_ mentioned by Aristotle. For the _sense_ of prudence is
also called _understanding_: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic.
vi, 11): "Of such things one needs to have the sense, and this is
understanding." Of these eight, five belong to prudence as a
cognitive virtue, namely, _memory, reasoning, understanding,
_docility_ and _shrewdness:_ while the three others belong thereto,
as commanding and applying knowledge to action, namely, _foresight,
circumspection_ and _caution._ The reason of their difference is seen
from the fact that three things may be observed in reference to
knowledge. In the first place, knowledge itself, which, if it be of
the past, is called _memory,_ if of the present, whether contingent
or necessary, is called _understanding_ or _intelligence._ Secondly,
the acquiring of knowledge, which is caused either by teaching, to
which pertains _docility,_ or by _discovery,_ and to this belongs to
_eustochia_, i.e. "a happy conjecture," of which _shrewdness_ is a
part, which is a "quick conjecture of the middle term," as stated in
Poster. i, 9. Thirdly, the use of knowledge, in as much as we proceed
from things known to knowledge or judgment of other things, and this
belongs to _reasoning._ And the reason, in order to command aright,
requires to have three conditions. First, to order that which is
befitting the end, and this belongs to _foresight;_ secondly, to
attend to the circumstances of the matter in hand, and this belongs
to _circumspection;_ thirdly, to avoid obstacles, and this belongs to
_caution._
The subjective parts of a virtue are its various species. In this way
the parts of prudence, if we take them properly, are the prudence
whereby a man rules himself, and the prudence whereby a man governs a
multitude, which differ specifically as stated above (Q. 47, A. 11).
Again, the prudence whereby a multitude is governed, is divided into
various species according to the various kinds of multitude. There is
the multitude which is united together for some particular purpose;
thus an army is gathered together to fight, and the prudence that
governs this is called _military._ There is also the multitude that
is united together for the whole of life; such is the multitude of a
home or family, and this is ruled by _domestic prudence_: and such
again is the multitude of a city or kingdom, the ruling principle of
which is _regnative prudence_ in the ruler, and _political prudence,_
simply so called, in the subjects.
If, however, prudence be taken in a wide sense, as including also
speculative knowledge, as stated above (Q. 47, A. 2, ad 2) then its
parts include _dialectics,_ _rhetoric_ and _physics,_ according to
three methods of prudence in the sciences. The first of these is the
attaining of science by demonstration, which belongs to _physics_ (if
physics be understood to comprise all demonstrative sciences). The
second method is to arrive at an opinion through probable premises,
and this belongs to _dialectics._ The third method is to employ
conjectures in order to induce a certain suspicion, or to persuade
somewhat, and this belongs to _rhetoric._ It may be said, however,
that these three belong also to prudence properly so called, since it
argues sometimes from necessary premises, sometimes from
probabilities, and sometimes from conjectures.
The potential parts of a virtue are the virtues connected with it,
which are directed to certain secondary acts or matters, not having,
as it were, the whole power of the principal virtue. In this way the
parts of prudence are _good counsel,_ which concerns counsel,
_synesis,_ which concerns judgment in matters of ordinary occurrence,
and _gnome,_ which concerns judgment in matters of exception to the
law: while _prudence_ is about the chief act, viz. that of commanding.
Reply Obj. 1: The various enumerations differ, either because
different kinds of parts are assigned, or because that which is
mentioned in one enumeration includes several mentioned in another
enumeration. Thus Tully includes "caution" and "circumspection" under
"foresight," and "reasoning," "docility" and "shrewdness" under
"understanding."
Reply Obj. 2: Here domestic and civic prudence are not to be taken as
sciences, but as kinds of prudence. As to the other three, the reply
may be gathered from what has been said.
Reply Obj. 3: All these things are reckoned parts of prudence, not by
taking them altogether, but in so far as they are connected with
things pertaining to prudence.
Reply Obj. 4: Right command and right use always go together, because
the reason's command is followed by obedience on the part of the
lower powers, which pertain to use.
Reply Obj. 5: Solicitude is included under foresight.
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