Whether Prudence Can Be Lost Through Forgetfulness?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence can be lost through
forgetfulness. For since science is about necessary things, it is
more certain than prudence which is about contingent matters of
action. But science is lost by forgetfulness. Much more therefore is
prudence.
Obj. 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) "the same
things, but by a contrary process, engender and corrupt virtue." Now
the engendering of prudence requires experience which is made up "of
many memories," as he states at the beginning of his _Metaphysics_
(i, 1). Therefore since forgetfulness is contrary to memory, it seems
that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness.
Obj. 3: Further, there is no prudence without knowledge of
universals. But knowledge of universals can be lost through
forgetfulness. Therefore prudence can also.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that
"forgetfulness is possible to art but not to prudence."
_I answer that,_ Forgetfulness regards knowledge only, wherefore one
can forget art and science, so as to lose them altogether, because
they belong to the reason. But prudence consists not in knowledge
alone, but also in an act of the appetite, because as stated above
(A. 8), its principal act is one of command, whereby a man applies
the knowledge he has, to the purpose of appetition and operation.
Hence prudence is not taken away directly by forgetfulness, but
rather is corrupted by the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.
vi, 5) that "pleasure and sorrow pervert the estimate of prudence":
wherefore it is written (Dan. 13:56): "Beauty hath deceived thee, and
lust hath subverted thy heart," and (Ex. 23:8): "Neither shalt thou
take bribes which blind even the prudent [Douay: 'wise']."
Nevertheless forgetfulness may hinder prudence, in so far as the
latter's command depends on knowledge which may be forgotten.
Reply Obj. 1: Science is in the reason only: hence the comparison
fails, as stated above [*Cf. I-II, Q. 53, A. 1].
Reply Obj. 2: The experience required by prudence results not from
memory alone, but also from the practice of commanding aright.
Reply Obj. 3: Prudence consists chiefly, not in the knowledge of
universals, but in applying them to action, as stated above (A. 3).
Wherefore forgetting the knowledge of universals does not destroy the
principal part of prudence, but hinders it somewhat, as stated above.
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