Whether the Precept of Love of Our Neighbor Is Fittingly Expressed?
Objection 1: It would seem that the precept of the love of our
neighbor is unfittingly expressed. For the love of charity extends to
all men, even to our enemies, as may be seen in Matt. 5:44. But the
word "neighbor" denotes a kind of "nighness" which does not seem to
exist towards all men. Therefore it seems that this precept is
unfittingly expressed.
Obj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) "the
origin of our friendly relations with others lies in our relation to
ourselves," whence it seems to follow that love of self is the origin
of one's love for one's neighbor. Now the principle is greater than
that which results from it. Therefore man ought not to love his
neighbor as himself.
Obj. 3: Further, man loves himself, but not his neighbor, naturally.
Therefore it is unfitting that he should be commanded to love his
neighbor as himself.
_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 22:39): "The second"
commandment "is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as
thyself."
_I answer that,_ This precept is fittingly expressed, for it
indicates both the reason for loving and the mode of love. The reason
for loving is indicated in the word "neighbor," because the reason
why we ought to love others out of charity is because they are nigh
to us, both as to the natural image of God, and as to the capacity
for glory. Nor does it matter whether we say "neighbor," or "brother"
according to 1 John 4:21, or "friend," according to Lev. 19:18,
because all these words express the same affinity.
The mode of love is indicated in the words "as thyself." This does
not mean that a man must love his neighbor equally as himself, but in
like manner as himself, and this in three ways. First, as regards the
end, namely, that he should love his neighbor for God's sake, even as
he loves himself for God's sake, so that his love for his neighbor is
a _holy_ love. Secondly, as regards the rule of love, namely, that a
man should not give way to his neighbor in evil, but only in good
things, even as he ought to gratify his will in good things alone, so
that his love for his neighbor may be a _righteous_ love. Thirdly, as
regards the reason for loving, namely, that a man should love his
neighbor, not for his own profit, or pleasure, but in the sense of
wishing his neighbor well, even as he wishes himself well, so that
his love for his neighbor may be a _true_ love: since when a man
loves his neighbor for his own profit or pleasure, he does not love
his neighbor truly, but loves himself.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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