THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 35, Art. 3]

Whether Sloth Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a mortal sin. For every

mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Divine Law. But sloth

seems contrary to no precept, as one may see by going through the

precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore sloth is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, in the same genus, a sin of deed is no less grievous

than a sin of thought. Now it is not a mortal sin to refrain in deed

from some spiritual good which leads to God, else it would be a

mortal sin not to observe the counsels. Therefore it is not a mortal

sin to refrain in thought from such like spiritual works. Therefore

sloth is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, no mortal sin is to be found in a perfect man. But

sloth is to be found in a perfect man: for Cassian says (De Instit.

Caenob. x, l) that "sloth is well known to the solitary, and is a

most vexatious and persistent foe to the hermit." Therefore sloth is

not always a mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Cor. 7:20): "The sorrow of the

world worketh death." But such is sloth; for it is not sorrow

"according to God," which is contrasted with sorrow of the world.

Therefore it is a mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 88, AA. 1, 2), mortal sin

is so called because it destroys the spiritual life which is the

effect of charity, whereby God dwells in us. Wherefore any sin which

by its very nature is contrary to charity is a mortal sin by reason

of its genus. And such is sloth, because the proper effect of charity

is joy in God, as stated above (Q. 28, A. 1), while sloth is sorrow

about spiritual good in as much as it is a Divine good. Therefore

sloth is a mortal sin in respect of its genus. But it must be

observed with regard to all sins that are mortal in respect of their

genus, that they are not mortal, save when they attain to their

perfection. Because the consummation of sin is in the consent of

reason: for we are speaking now of human sins consisting in human

acts, the principle of which is the reason. Wherefore if the sin be a

mere beginning of sin in the sensuality alone, without attaining to

the consent of reason, it is a venial sin on account of the

imperfection of the act. Thus in the genus of adultery, the

concupiscence that goes no further than the sensuality is a venial

sin, whereas if it reach to the consent of reason, it is a mortal

sin. So too, the movement of sloth is sometimes in the sensuality

alone, by reason of the opposition of the flesh to the spirit, and

then it is a venial sin; whereas sometimes it reaches to the reason,

which consents in the dislike, horror and detestation of the Divine

good, on account of the flesh utterly prevailing over the spirit. In

this case it is evident that sloth is a mortal sin.

Reply Obj. 1: Sloth is opposed to the precept about hallowing the

Sabbath day. For this precept, in so far as it is a moral precept,

implicitly commands the mind to rest in God: and sorrow of the mind

about the Divine good is contrary thereto.

Reply Obj. 2: Sloth is not an aversion of the mind from any spiritual

good, but from the Divine good, to which the mind is obliged to

adhere. Wherefore if a man is sorry because someone forces him to do

acts of virtue that he is not bound to do, this is not a sin of

sloth; but when he is sorry to have to do something for God's sake.

Reply Obj. 3: Imperfect movements of sloth are to be found in holy

men, but they do not reach to the consent of reason.

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Summa Theologica, Part II-II (Secunda Secundae) Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province · 第 261 / 1128 题