Whether Almsgiving Is an Act of Charity?
Objection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not an act of charity.
For without charity one cannot do acts of charity. Now it is possible
to give alms without having charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:3: "If I
should distribute all my goods to feed the poor . . . and have not
charity, it profiteth me nothing." Therefore almsgiving is not an act
of charity.
Obj. 2: Further, almsdeeds are reckoned among works of satisfaction,
according to Dan. 4:24: "Redeem thou thy sins with alms." Now
satisfaction is an act of justice. Therefore almsgiving is an act of
justice and not of charity.
Obj. 3: Further, the offering of sacrifices to God is an act of
religion. But almsgiving is offering a sacrifice to God, according to
Heb. 13:16: "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such
sacrifices God's favor is obtained." Therefore almsgiving is not an
act of charity, but of religion.
Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that to give for
a good purpose is an act of liberality. Now this is especially true
of almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is not an act of charity.
_On the contrary,_ It is written 2 John 3:17: "He that hath the
substance of this world, and shall see his brother in need, and shall
put up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in him?"
_I answer that,_ External acts belong to that virtue which regards
the motive for doing those acts. Now the motive for giving alms is to
relieve one who is in need. Wherefore some have defined alms as being
"a deed whereby something is given to the needy, out of compassion
and for God's sake," which motive belongs to mercy, as stated above
(Q. 30, AA. 1, 2). Hence it is clear that almsgiving is, properly
speaking, an act of mercy. This appears in its very name, for in
Greek (_eleemosyne_) it is derived from having mercy (_eleein_) even
as the Latin _miseratio_ is. And since mercy is an effect of charity,
as shown above (Q. 30, A. 2, A. 3, Obj. 3), it follows that
almsgiving is an act of charity through the medium of mercy.
Reply Obj. 1: An act of virtue may be taken in two ways: first
materially, thus an act of justice is to do what is just; and such an
act of virtue can be without the virtue, since many, without having
the habit of justice, do what is just, led by the natural light of
reason, or through fear, or in the hope of gain. Secondly, we speak
of a thing being an act of justice formally, and thus an act of
justice is to do what is just, in the same way as a just man, i.e.
with readiness and delight, and such an act of virtue cannot be
without the virtue.
Accordingly almsgiving can be materially without charity, but to give
alms formally, i.e. for God's sake, with delight and readiness, and
altogether as one ought, is not possible without charity.
Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders the proper elicited act of one virtue
being commanded by another virtue as commanding it and directing it
to this other virtue's end. It is in this way that almsgiving is
reckoned among works of satisfaction in so far as pity for the one in
distress is directed to the satisfaction for his sin; and in so far
as it is directed to placate God, it has the character of a
sacrifice, and thus it is commanded by religion.
Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.
Reply Obj. 4: Almsgiving belongs to liberality, in so far as
liberality removes an obstacle to that act, which might arise from
excessive love of riches, the result of which is that one clings to
them more than one ought.
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