Whether It Is More Meritorious to Love an Enemy Than to Love a Friend?
Objection 1: It would seem more meritorious to love an enemy than to
love a friend. For it is written (Matt. 5:46): "If you love them that
love you, what reward shall you have?" Therefore it is not deserving
of reward to love one's friend: whereas, as the same passage proves,
to love one's enemy is deserving of a reward. Therefore it is more
meritorious to love one's enemy than to love one's friend.
Obj. 2: Further, an act is the more meritorious through proceeding
from a greater charity. But it belongs to the perfect children of God
to love their enemies, whereas those also who have imperfect charity
love their friends. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's
enemy than to love one's friend.
Obj. 3: Further, where there is more effort for good, there seems to
be more merit, since "every man shall receive his own reward
according to his own labor" (1 Cor. 3:8). Now a man has to make a
greater effort to love his enemy than to love his friend, because it
is more difficult. Therefore it seems more meritorious to love one's
enemy than to love one's friend.
_On the contrary,_ The better an action is, the more meritorious it
is. Now it is better to love one's friend, since it is better to love
a better man, and the friend who loves you is better than the enemy
who hates you. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one's friend
than to love one's enemy.
_I answer that,_ God is the reason for our loving our neighbor out of
charity, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1). When therefore it is asked
which is better or more meritorious, to love one's friend or one's
enemy, these two loves may be compared in two ways, first, on the
part of our neighbor whom we love, secondly, on the part of the
reason for which we love him.
In the first way, love of one's friend surpasses love of one's enemy,
because a friend is both better and more closely united to us, so
that he is a more suitable matter of love and consequently the act of
love that passes over this matter, is better, and therefore its
opposite is worse, for it is worse to hate a friend than an enemy.
In the second way, however, it is better to love one's enemy than
one's friend, and this for two reasons. First, because it is possible
to love one's friend for another reason than God, whereas God is the
only reason for loving one's enemy. Secondly, because if we suppose
that both are loved for God, our love for God is proved to be all the
stronger through carrying a man's affections to things which are
furthest from him, namely, to the love of his enemies, even as the
power of a furnace is proved to be the stronger, according as it
throws its heat to more distant objects. Hence our love for God is
proved to be so much the stronger, as the more difficult are the
things we accomplish for its sake, just as the power of fire is so
much the stronger, as it is able to set fire to a less inflammable
matter.
Yet just as the same fire acts with greater force on what is near
than on what is distant, so too, charity loves with greater fervor
those who are united to us than those who are far removed; and in
this respect the love of friends, considered in itself, is more
ardent and better than the love of one's enemy.
Reply Obj. 1: The words of Our Lord must be taken in their strict
sense: because the love of one's friends is not meritorious in God's
sight when we love them merely because they are our friends: and this
would seem to be the case when we love our friends in such a way that
we love not our enemies. On the other hand the love of our friends is
meritorious, if we love them for God's sake, and not merely because
they are our friends.
The Reply to the other Objections is evident from what has been said
in the article, because the two arguments that follow consider the
reason for loving, while the last considers the question on the part
of those who are loved.
_______________________