Whether to Love Considered As an Act of Charity Is the Same As
Goodwill?
Objection 1: It would seem that to love, considered as an act of
charity, is nothing else than goodwill. For the Philosopher says
(Rhet. ii, 4) that "to love is to wish a person well"; and this is
goodwill. Therefore the act of charity is nothing but goodwill.
Obj. 2: Further, the act belongs to the same subject as the habit.
Now the habit of charity is in the power of the will, as stated above
(Q. 24, A. 1). Therefore the act of charity is also an act of the
will. But it tends to good only, and this is goodwill. Therefore the
act of charity is nothing else than goodwill.
Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher reckons five things pertaining to
friendship (Ethic. ix, 4), the first of which is that a man should
wish his friend well; the second, that he should wish him to be and
to live; the third, that he should take pleasure in his company; the
fourth, that he should make choice of the same things; the fifth,
that he should grieve and rejoice with him. Now the first two pertain
to goodwill. Therefore goodwill is the first act of charity.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that "goodwill
is neither friendship nor love, but the beginning of friendship." Now
charity is friendship, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1). Therefore
goodwill is not the same as to love considered as an act of charity.
_I answer that,_ Goodwill properly speaking is that act of the will
whereby we wish well to another. Now this act of the will differs
from actual love, considered not only as being in the sensitive
appetite but also as being in the intellective appetite or will. For
the love which is in the sensitive appetite is a passion. Now every
passion seeks its object with a certain eagerness. And the passion of
love is not aroused suddenly, but is born of an earnest consideration
of the object loved; wherefore the Philosopher, showing the
difference between goodwill and the love which is a passion, says
(Ethic. ix, 5) that goodwill does not imply impetuosity or desire,
that is to say, has not an eager inclination, because it is by the
sole judgment of his reason that one man wishes another well. Again
such like love arises from previous acquaintance, whereas goodwill
sometimes arises suddenly, as happens to us if we look on at a
boxing-match, and we wish one of the boxers to win. But the love,
which is in the intellective appetite, also differs from goodwill,
because it denotes a certain union of affections between the lover
and the beloved, in as much as the lover deems the beloved as
somewhat united to him, or belonging to him, and so tends towards
him. On the other hand, goodwill is a simple act of the will, whereby
we wish a person well, even without presupposing the aforesaid union
of the affections with him. Accordingly, to love, considered as an
act of charity, includes goodwill, but such dilection or love adds
union of affections, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5)
that "goodwill is a beginning of friendship."
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher, by thus defining "to love," does not
describe it fully, but mentions only that part of its definition in
which the act of love is chiefly manifested.
Reply Obj. 2: To love is indeed an act of the will tending to the
good, but it adds a certain union with the beloved, which union is
not denoted by goodwill.
Reply Obj. 3: These things mentioned by the Philosopher belong to
friendship because they arise from a man's love for himself, as he
says in the same passage, in so far as a man does all these things in
respect of his friend, even as he does them to himself: and this
belongs to the aforesaid union of the affections.
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