Whether We Ought to Love One Neighbor More Than Another?
Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love one neighbor
more than another. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28): "One
ought to love all men equally. Since, however, one cannot do good to
all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by reason of place, time
or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance, are more closely
united to us." Therefore one neighbor ought not to be loved more than
another.
Obj. 2: Further, where there is one and the same reason for loving
several, there should be no inequality of love. Now there is one and
the same reason for loving all one's neighbors, which reason is God,
as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27). Therefore we ought to
love all our neighbors equally.
Obj. 3: Further, to love a man is to wish him good things, as the
Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4). Now to all our neighbors we wish an
equal good, viz. everlasting life. Therefore we ought to love all our
neighbors equally.
_On the contrary,_ One's obligation to love a person is proportionate
to the gravity of the sin one commits in acting against that love.
Now it is a more grievous sin to act against the love of certain
neighbors, than against the love of others. Hence the commandment
(Lev. 10:9), "He that curseth his father or mother, dying let him
die," which does not apply to those who cursed others than the above.
Therefore we ought to love some neighbors more than others.
_I answer that,_ There have been two opinions on this question: for
some have said that we ought, out of charity, to love all our
neighbors equally, as regards our affection, but not as regards the
outward effect. They held that the order of love is to be understood
as applying to outward favors, which we ought to confer on those who
are connected with us in preference to those who are unconnected, and
not to the inward affection, which ought to be given equally to all
including our enemies.
But this is unreasonable. For the affection of charity, which is the
inclination of grace, is not less orderly than the natural appetite,
which is the inclination of nature, for both inclinations flow from
Divine wisdom. Now we observe in the physical order that the natural
inclination in each thing is proportionate to the act or movement
that is becoming to the nature of that thing: thus in earth the
inclination of gravity is greater than in water, because it is
becoming to earth to be beneath water. Consequently the inclination
also of grace which is the effect of charity, must needs be
proportionate to those actions which have to be performed outwardly,
so that, to wit, the affection of our charity be more intense towards
those to whom we ought to behave with greater kindness.
We must, therefore, say that, even as regards the affection we ought
to love one neighbor more than another. The reason is that, since the
principle of love is God, and the person who loves, it must needs be
that the affection of love increases in proportion to the nearness to
one or the other of those principles. For as we stated above (A. 1),
wherever we find a principle, order depends on relation to that
principle.
Reply Obj. 1: Love can be unequal in two ways: first on the part of
the good we wish our friend. In this respect we love all men equally
out of charity: because we wish them all one same generic good,
namely everlasting happiness. Secondly love is said to be greater
through its action being more intense: and in this way we ought not
to love all equally.
Or we may reply that we have unequal love for certain persons in two
ways: first, through our loving some and not loving others. As
regards beneficence we are bound to observe this inequality, because
we cannot do good to all: but as regards benevolence, love ought not
to be thus unequal. The other inequality arises from our loving some
more than others: and Augustine does not mean to exclude the latter
inequality, but the former, as is evident from what he says of
beneficence.
Reply Obj. 2: Our neighbors are not all equally related to God; some
are nearer to Him, by reason of their greater goodness, and those we
ought, out of charity, to love more than those who are not so near to
Him.
Reply Obj. 3: This argument considers the quantity of love on the
part of the good which we wish our friends.
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