Whether Out of Charity, Man Is Bound to Love God More Than Himself?
Objection 1: It would seem that man is not bound, out of charity, to
love God more than himself. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8)
that "a man's friendly relations with others arise from his friendly
relations with himself." Now the cause is stronger than its effect.
Therefore man's friendship towards himself is greater than his
friendship for anyone else. Therefore he ought to love himself more
than God.
Obj. 2: Further, one loves a thing in so far as it is one's own good.
Now the reason for loving a thing is more loved than the thing itself
which is loved for that reason, even as the principles which are the
reason for knowing a thing are more known. Therefore man loves
himself more than any other good loved by him. Therefore he does not
love God more than himself.
Obj. 3: Further, a man loves God as much as he loves to enjoy God.
But a man loves himself as much as he loves to enjoy God; since this
is the highest good a man can wish for himself. Therefore man is not
bound, out of charity, to love God more than himself.
_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22): "If thou
oughtest to love thyself, not for thy own sake, but for the sake of
Him in Whom is the rightest end of thy love, let no other man take
offense if him also thou lovest for God's sake." Now "the cause of a
thing being such is yet more so." Therefore man ought to love God
more than himself.
_I answer that,_ The good we receive from God is twofold, the good of
nature, and the good of grace. Now the fellowship of natural goods
bestowed on us by God is the foundation of natural love, in virtue of
which not only man, so long as his nature remains unimpaired, loves
God above all things and more than himself, but also every single
creature, each in its own way, i.e. either by an intellectual, or by
a rational, or by an animal, or at least by a natural love, as stones
do, for instance, and other things bereft of knowledge, because each
part naturally loves the common good of the whole more than its own
particular good. This is evidenced by its operation, since the
principal inclination of each part is towards common action conducive
to the good of the whole. It may also be seen in civic virtues
whereby sometimes the citizens suffer damage even to their own
property and persons for the sake of the common good. Wherefore much
more is this realized with regard to the friendship of charity which
is based on the fellowship of the gifts of grace.
Therefore man ought, out of charity, to love God, Who is the common
good of all, more than himself: since happiness is in God as in the
universal and fountain principle of all who are able to have a share
of that happiness.
Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of friendly relations
towards another person in whom the good, which is the object of
friendship, resides in some restricted way; and not of friendly
relations with another in whom the aforesaid good resides in totality.
Reply Obj. 2: The part does indeed love the good of the whole, as
becomes a part, not however so as to refer the good of the whole to
itself, but rather itself to the good of the whole.
Reply Obj. 3: That a man wishes to enjoy God pertains to that love of
God which is love of concupiscence. Now we love God with the love of
friendship more than with the love of concupiscence, because the
Divine good is greater in itself, than our share of good in enjoying
Him. Hence, out of charity, man simply loves God more than himself.
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