Whether There Can Be Despair Without Unbelief?
Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no despair without
unbelief. For the certainty of hope is derived from faith; and so
long as the cause remains the effect is not done away. Therefore a
man cannot lose the certainty of hope, by despairing, unless his
faith be removed.
Obj. 2: Further, to prefer one's own guilt to God's mercy and
goodness, is to deny the infinity of God's goodness and mercy, and so
savors of unbelief. But whoever despairs, prefers his own guilt to
the Divine mercy and goodness, according to Gen. 4:13: "My iniquity
is greater than that I may deserve pardon." Therefore whoever
despairs, is an unbeliever.
Obj. 3: Further, whoever falls into a condemned heresy, is an
unbeliever. But he that despairs seems to fall into a condemned
heresy, viz. that of the Novatians, who say that there is no pardon
for sins after Baptism. Therefore it seems that whoever despairs, is
an unbeliever.
_On the contrary,_ If we remove that which follows, that which
precedes remains. But hope follows faith, as stated above (Q. 17, A.
7). Therefore when hope is removed, faith can remain; so that, not
everyone who despairs, is an unbeliever.
_I answer that,_ Unbelief pertains to the intellect, but despair, to
the appetite: and the intellect is about universals, while the
appetite is moved in connection with particulars, since the
appetitive movement is from the soul towards things, which, in
themselves, are particular. Now it may happen that a man, while
having a right opinion in the universal, is not rightly disposed as
to his appetitive movement, his estimate being corrupted in a
particular matter, because, in order to pass from the universal
opinion to the appetite for a particular thing, it is necessary to
have a particular estimate (De Anima iii, 2), just as it is
impossible to infer a particular conclusion from an universal
proposition, except through the holding of a particular proposition.
Hence it is that a man, while having right faith, in the universal,
fails in an appetitive movement, in regard to some particular, his
particular estimate being corrupted by a habit or a passion, just as
the fornicator, by choosing fornication as a good for himself at this
particular moment, has a corrupt estimate in a particular matter,
although he retains the true universal estimate according to faith,
viz. that fornication is a mortal sin. In the same way, a man while
retaining in the universal, the true estimate of faith, viz. that
there is in the Church the power of forgiving sins, may suffer a
movement of despair, to wit, that for him, being in such a state,
there is no hope of pardon, his estimate being corrupted in a
particular matter. In this way there can be despair, just as there
can be other mortal sins, without belief.
Reply Obj. 1: The effect is done away, not only when the first cause
is removed, but also when the secondary cause is removed. Hence the
movement of hope can be done away, not only by the removal of the
universal estimate of faith, which is, so to say, the first cause of
the certainty of hope, but also by the removal of the particular
estimate, which is the secondary cause, as it were.
Reply Obj. 2: If anyone were to judge, in universal, that God's mercy
is not infinite, he would be an unbeliever. But he who despairs
judges not thus, but that, for him in that state, on account of some
particular disposition, there is no hope of the Divine mercy.
The same answer applies to the Third Objection, since the Novatians
denied, in universal, that there is remission of sins in the Church.
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