Whether Faith Is More Certain Than Science and the Other Intellectual
Virtues?
Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not more certain than
science and the other intellectual virtues. For doubt is opposed to
certitude, wherefore a thing would seem to be the more certain,
through being less doubtful, just as a thing is the whiter, the less
it has of an admixture of black. Now understanding, science and also
wisdom are free of any doubt about their objects; whereas the
believer may sometimes suffer a movement of doubt, and doubt about
matters of faith. Therefore faith is no more certain than the
intellectual virtues.
Obj. 2: Further, sight is more certain than hearing. But "faith is
through hearing" according to Rom. 10:17; whereas understanding,
science and wisdom imply some kind of intellectual sight. Therefore
science and understanding are more certain than faith.
Obj. 3: Further, in matters concerning the intellect, the more
perfect is the more certain. Now understanding is more perfect than
faith, since faith is the way to understanding, according to another
version [*The Septuagint] of Isa. 7:9: "If you will not believe, you
shall not understand [Vulg.: 'continue']": and Augustine says (De
Trin. xiv, 1) that "faith is strengthened by science." Therefore it
seems that science or understanding is more certain than faith.
_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:15): "When you had
received of us the word of the hearing," i.e. by faith . . . "you
received it not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the word
of God." Now nothing is more certain than the word of God. Therefore
science is not more certain than faith; nor is anything else.
_I answer that,_ As stated above (I-II, Q. 57, A. 4, ad 2) two of the
intellectual virtues are about contingent matter, viz. prudence and
art; to which faith is preferable in point of certitude, by reason of
its matter, since it is about eternal things, which never change,
whereas the other three intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science
[*In English the corresponding 'gift' is called knowledge] and
understanding, are about necessary things, as stated above (I-II, Q.
57, A. 5, ad 3). But it must be observed that wisdom, science and
understanding may be taken in two ways: first, as intellectual
virtues, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2, 3); secondly,
for the gifts of the Holy Ghost. If we consider them in the first
way, we must note that certitude can be looked at in two ways. First,
on the part of its cause, and thus a thing which has a more certain
cause, is itself more certain. In this way faith is more certain than
those three virtues, because it is founded on the Divine truth,
whereas the aforesaid three virtues are based on human reason.
Secondly, certitude may be considered on the part of the subject, and
thus the more a man's intellect lays hold of a thing, the more
certain it is. In this way, faith is less certain, because matters of
faith are above the human intellect, whereas the objects of the
aforesaid three virtues are not. Since, however, a thing is judged
simply with regard to its cause, but relatively, with respect to a
disposition on the part of the subject, it follows that faith is more
certain simply, while the others are more certain relatively, i.e.
for us. Likewise if these three be taken as gifts received in this
present life, they are related to faith as to their principle which
they presuppose: so that again, in this way, faith is more certain.
Reply Obj. 1: This doubt is not on the side of the cause of faith,
but on our side, in so far as we do not fully grasp matters of faith
with our intellect.
Reply Obj. 2: Other things being equal sight is more certain than
hearing; but if (the authority of) the person from whom we hear
greatly surpasses that of the seer's sight, hearing is more certain
than sight: thus a man of little science is more certain about what
he hears on the authority of an expert in science, than about what is
apparent to him according to his own reason: and much more is a man
certain about what he hears from God, Who cannot be deceived, than
about what he sees with his own reason, which can be mistaken.
Reply Obj. 3: The gifts of understanding and knowledge are more
perfect than the knowledge of faith in the point of their greater
clearness, but not in regard to more certain adhesion: because the
whole certitude of the gifts of understanding and knowledge, arises
from the certitude of faith, even as the certitude of the knowledge
of conclusions arises from the certitude of premisses. But in so far
as science, wisdom and understanding are intellectual virtues, they
are based upon the natural light of reason, which falls short of the
certitude of God's word, on which faith is founded.
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