WASHINGTON, _January 15, 1836_.
_To the Senate and House of Representatives_.
GENTLEMEN: In my message at the opening of your session I informed you
that our chargé d'affaires at Paris had been instructed to ask for the
final determination of the French Government in relation to the payment
of the indemnification secured by the treaty of the 4th of July, 1831,
and that when advices of the result should be received it would be made
the subject of a special communication.
In execution of this design I now transmit to you the papers
numbered from 1 to 13, inclusive, containing among other things the
correspondence on this subject between our chargé d'affaires and the
French minister of foreign affairs, from which it will be seen that
France requires as a condition precedent to the execution of a treaty
unconditionally ratified and to the payment of a debt acknowledged by
all the branches of her Government to be due that certain explanations
shall be made of which she dictates the terms. These terms are such as
that Government has already been officially informed can not be complied
with, and if persisted in they must be considered as a deliberate
refusal on the part of France to fulfill engagements binding by the laws
of nations and held sacred by the whole civilized world. The nature of
the act which France requires from this Government is clearly set forth
in the letter of the French minister marked No. 4. We will pay the
money, says he, when "_the Government of the United States is ready on
its part to declare to us, by addressing its claim to us officially in
writing, that it regrets the misunderstanding which has arisen between
the two countries; that this misunderstanding is founded on a mistake;
that it never entered into its intention to call in question the good
faith of the French Government nor to take a menacing attitude toward
France."_ And he adds: _"If the Government of the United States does
not give this assurance we shall be obliged to think that this
misunderstanding is not the result of an error."_ In the letter marked
No. 6 the French minister also remarks that _"the Government of the
United States knows that upon itself depends henceforward the execution
of the treaty of July 4, 1831_."
Obliged by the precise language thus used by the French minister to
view it as a peremptory refusal to execute the treaty except on terms
incompatible with the honor and independence of the United States, and
persuaded that on considering the correspondence now submitted to you
you can regard it in no other light, it becomes my duty to call your
attention to such measures as the exigency of the case demands if the
claim of interfering in the communications between the different
branches of our Government shall be persisted in. This pretension is
rendered the more unreasonable by the fact that the substance of the
required explanation has been repeatedly and voluntarily given before it
was insisted on as a condition--a condition the more humiliating because
it is demanded as the equivalent of a pecuniary consideration. Does
France desire only a declaration that we had no intention to obtain our
rights by an address to her fears rather than to her justice? She has
already had it, frankly and explicitly given by our minister accredited
to her Government, his act ratified by me, and my confirmation of it
officially communicated by him in his letter to the French minister
of foreign affairs of the 25th of April, 1835, and repeated by my
published approval of that letter after the passage of the bill of
indemnification. Does France want a degrading, servile repetition of
this act, in terms which she shall dictate and which will involve
an acknowledgment of her assumed right to interfere in our domestic
councils? She will never obtain it. The spirit of the American people,
the dignity of the Legislature, and the firm resolve of their executive
government forbid it.
As the answer of the French minister to our chargé d'affaires at Paris
contains an allusion to a letter addressed by him to the representative
of France at this place, it now becomes proper to lay before you the
correspondence had between that functionary and the Secretary of
State relative to that letter, and to accompany the same with such
explanations as will enable you to understand the course of the
Executive in regard to it. Recurring to the historical statement made
at the commencement of your session, of the origin and progress of our
difficulties with France, it will be recollected that on the return of
our minister to the United States I caused my official approval of the
explanations he had given to the French minister of foreign affairs to
be made public. As the French Government had noticed the message without
its being officially communicated, it was not doubted that if they
were disposed to pay the money due to us they would notice any public
explanation of the Government of the United States in the same way. But,
contrary to these well-founded expectations, the French ministry did not
take this fair opportunity to relieve themselves from their unfortunate
position and to do justice to the United States.
Whilst, however, the Government of the United States was awaiting the
movements of the French Government in perfect confidence that the
difficulty was at an end, the Secretary of State received a call from
the French chargé d'affaires in Washington, who desired to read to him
a letter he had received from the French minister of foreign affairs.
He was asked whether he was instructed or directed to make any official
communication, and replied that he was only authorized to read the
letter and furnish a copy if requested. The substance of its contents,
it is presumed, may be gathered from Nos. 4 and 6, herewith transmitted.
It was an attempt to make known to the Government of the United States
privately in what manner it could make explanations, apparently
voluntary, but really dictated by France, acceptable to her, and thus
obtain payment of the 25,000,000 francs. No exception was taken to this
mode of communication, which is often used to prepare the way for
official intercourse, but the suggestions made in it were in their
substance wholly inadmissible. Not being in the shape of an official
communication to this Government, it did not admit of reply or official
notice, nor could it safely be made the basis of any action by the
Executive or the Legislature, and the Secretary of State did not think
proper to ask a copy, because he could have no use for it. Copies of
papers marked Nos. 9, 10, and 11 shew an attempt on the part of the
French chargé d'affaires to place a copy of this letter among the
archives of this Government, which for obvious reasons was not allowed
to be done; but the assurance before given was repeated, that any
official communication which he might be authorized to make in the
accustomed form would receive a prompt and just consideration. The
indiscretion of this attempt was made more manifest by the subsequent
avowal of the French chargé d'affaires that the object was to bring this
letter before Congress and the American people. If foreign agents, on
a subject of disagreement between their government and this, wish to
prefer an appeal to the American people, they will hereafter, it is
hoped, better appreciate their own rights and the respect due to others
than to attempt to use the Executive as the passive organ of their
communications.
It is due to the character of our institutions that the diplomatic
intercourse of this Government should be conducted with the utmost
directness and simplicity, and that in all cases of importance the
communications received or made by the Executive should assume the
accustomed official form. It is only by insisting on this form that
foreign powers can be held to full responsibility, that their
communications can be officially replied to, or that the advice or
interference of the Legislature can with propriety be invited by the
President. This course is also best calculated, on the one hand, to
shield that officer from unjust suspicions, and on the other to subject
this portion of his acts to public scrutiny, and, if occasion shall
require it, to constitutional animadversion. It was the more necessary
to adhere to these principles in the instance in question inasmuch as,
in addition to other important interests, it very intimately concerned
the national honor--a matter in my judgment much too sacred to be made
the subject of private and unofficial negotiation.
It will be perceived that this letter of the French minister of foreign
affairs was read to the Secretary of State on the 11th of September
last. This was the first authentic indication of the specific views of
the French Government received by the Government of the United States
after the passage of the bill of indemnification. Inasmuch as the
letter had been written before the official notice of my approval of
Mr. Livingston's last explanation and remonstrance could have reached
Paris, just ground of hope was left, as has been before stated, that
the French Government, on receiving that information in the same manner
as the alleged offensive message had reached them, would desist from
their extraordinary demand and pay the money at once. To give them
an opportunity to do so, and, at all events, to elicit their final
determination and the ground they intended to occupy, the instructions
were given to our chargé d'affaires which were adverted to at the
commencement of the present session of Congress. The result, as you have
seen, is a demand of an official written expression of regrets and a
direct explanation addressed to France with a distinct intimation that
this is a _sine qua non_.
Mr. Barton having, in pursuance of his instructions, returned to the
United States and the chargé d'affaires of France having been recalled,
all diplomatic intercourse between the two countries is suspended, a
state of things originating in an unreasonable susceptibility on the
part of the French Government and rendered necessary on our part by
their refusal to perform engagements contained in a treaty from the
faithful performance of which by us they are to this day enjoying many
important commercial advantages.
It is time that this unequal position of affairs should cease, and that
legislative action should be brought to sustain Executive exertion in
such measures as the case requires. While France persists in her refusal
to comply with the terms of a treaty the object of which was, by
removing all causes of mutual complaint, to renew ancient feelings of
friendship and to unite the two nations in the bonds of amity and of a
mutually beneficial commerce, she can not justly complain if we adopt
such peaceful remedies as the law of nations and the circumstances of
the case may authorize and demand. Of the nature of these remedies I
have heretofore had occasion to speak, and, in reference to a particular
contingency, to express my conviction that reprisals would be best
adapted to the emergency then contemplated. Since that period France,
by all the departments of her Government, has acknowledged the validity
of our claims and the obligations of the treaty, and has appropriated
the moneys which are necessary to its execution; and though payment is
withheld on grounds vitally important to our existence as an independent
nation, it is not to be believed that she can have determined
permanently to retain a position so utterly indefensible. In the
altered state of the questions in controversy, and under all existing
circumstances, it appears to me that until such a determination shall
have become evident it will be proper and sufficient to retaliate her
present refusal to comply with her engagements by prohibiting the
introduction of French products and the entry of French vessels into our
ports. Between this and the interdiction of all commercial intercourse,
or other remedies, you, as the representatives of the people, must
determine. I recommend the former in the present posture of our affairs
as being the least injurious to our commerce, and as attended with the
least difficulty of returning to the usual state of friendly intercourse
if the Government of France shall render us the justice that is due,
and also as a proper preliminary step to stronger measures should their
adoption be rendered necessary by subsequent events.
The return of our chargé d'affaires is attended with public notices of
naval preparations on the part of France destined for our seas. Of the
cause and intent of these armaments I have no authentic information, nor
any other means of judging except such as are common to yourselves and
to the public; but whatever may be their object, we are not at liberty
to regard them as unconnected with the measures which hostile movements
on the part of France may compel us to pursue. They at least deserve to
be met by adequate preparation on our part, and I therefore strongly
urge large and speedy appropriations for the increase of the Navy and
the completion of our coast defenses.
If this array of military force be really designed to affect the action
of the Government and people of the United States on the questions now
pending between the two nations, then indeed would it be dishonorable
to pause a moment on the alternative which such a state of things would
present to us. Come what may, the explanation which France demands can
never be accorded, and no armament, however powerful and imposing, at a
distance or on our coast, will, I trust, deter us from discharging the
high duties which we owe to our constituents, our national character,
and to the world.
The House of Representatives at the close of the last session of
Congress unanimously resolved that the treaty of the 4th of July, 1831,
should be maintained and its execution insisted on by the United States.
It is due to the welfare of the human race not less than to our own
interests and honor that this resolution should at all hazards be
adhered to. If after so signal an example as that given by the American
people during their long-protracted difficulties with France of
forbearance under accumulated wrongs and of generous confidence in
her ultimate return to justice she shall now be permitted to withhold
from us the tardy and imperfect indemnification which after years of
remonstrance and discussion had at length been solemnly agreed on by
the treaty of 1831 and to set at naught the obligations it imposes, the
United States will not be the only sufferers. The efforts of humanity
and religion to substitute the appeals of justice and the arbitrament of
reason for the coercive measures usually resorted to by injured nations
will receive little encouragement from such an issue. By the selection
and enforcement of such lawful and expedient measures as may be
necessary to prevent a result so injurious to ourselves and so fatal to
the hopes of the philanthropist we shall therefore not only preserve the
pecuniary interests of our citizens, the independence of our Government,
and the honor of our country, but do much, it may be hoped, to vindicate
the faith of treaties and to promote the general interests of peace,
civilization, and improvement.