_Paris, April 25, 1835_.
His Excellency the Duc de Broglie, etc.,
_Minister Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs_.
SIR: About to return to my own country, I am unwilling to leave this
without adding one more effort to the many I have heretofore made to
restore to both that mutual good understanding which their best
interests require, and which probable events may interrupt and perhaps
permanently destroy.
From the correspondence and acts of His Majesty's Government since the
message of the President of the United States was known at Paris it is
evident that an idea is entertained of making the fulfillment of the
treaty of 1831 dependent on explanations to be given of the terms used
in the message, and withholding payment of an acknowledged debt until
satisfaction be given for a supposed indecorum in demanding it. The bare
possibility that this opinion might be entertained and acted upon by His
Majesty's Government renders it incumbent on me to state explicitly what
I understand to be the sentiments of mine on this subject.
Erroneous impressions, arising from the want of a proper attention to
the structure of our Government, to the duties of its Chief Magistrate,
to the principles it has adopted and its strict adherence to them in
similar cases, might raise expectations which could never be realized
and lead to measures destructive of all harmony between the parties.
This communication is made in full confidence that it is the wish of His
Majesty's Government, as it most sincerely is that of the President, to
avoid all measures of that description; and it is hoped, therefore, that
it will be received in the spirit by which it is dictated--that of
conciliation and peace.
The form of our Government and the functions of the President as
a component part of it have in their relation to this subject been
sufficiently explained in my previous correspondence, especially in
my letter to the Comte de Rigny of the 29th of January last. I have
therefore little to add to that part of my representation which is
drawn from the form of our Government and the duties of the President
in administering it. If these are fully understood, the principles of
action derived from them can not be mistaken.
The President, as the chief executive power, must have a free and
entirely unfettered communication with the coordinate powers of
Government. As the organ of intercourse with other nations, he is
the only source from which a knowledge of our relations with them
can be conveyed to the legislative branches. It results from this
that the utmost freedom from all restraint in the details into which
he is obliged to enter of international concerns and of the measures
in relation to them is essential to the proper performance of this
important part of his functions. He must exercise them without having
continually before him the fear of offending the susceptibility of the
powers whose conduct he is obliged to notice. In the performance of this
duty he is subject to public opinion and his own sense of propriety
for an indiscreet, to his constituents for a dangerous, and to his
constitutional judges for an illegal, exercise of the power, but to no
other censure, foreign or domestic. Were any foreign powers permitted to
scan the communications of the Executive, their complaints, whether real
or affected, would involve the country in continual controversies; for
the right being acknowledged, it would be a duty to exercise it by
demanding a disavowal of every phrase they might deem offensive and an
explanation of every word to which an improper interpretation could be
given. The principle, therefore, has been adopted that no foreign power
has a right to ask for explanations of anything that the President,
in the exercise of his functions, thinks proper to communicate to
Congress, or of any course he may advise them to pursue. This rule is
not applicable to the Government of the United States alone, but, in
common with it, to all those in which the constitutional powers are
distributed into different branches. No such nation desirous of avoiding
foreign influence or foreign interference in its councils; no such
nation possessing a due sense of its dignity and independence, can long
submit to the consequences of this interference. When these are felt, as
they soon will be, all must unite in repelling it, and acknowledge that
the United States are contending in a cause common to them all, and more
important to the liberal Governments of Europe than even to themselves;
for it is too obvious to escape the slightest attention that the
Monarchies of Europe by which they are surrounded will have all the
advantage of this supervision of the domestic councils of their
neighbors without being subject to it themselves. It is true that in
the representative Governments of Europe executive communications to
legislative bodies have not the extension that is given to them in the
United States, and that they are therefore less liable to attack on that
quarter; but they must not imagine themselves safe. In the opening
address, guarded as it commonly is, every proposition made by the
ministry, every resolution of either chamber, will offer occasions for
the jealous interference of national punctilio, for all occupy the same
grounds. No intercommunication of the different branches of Government
will be safe, and even the courts of justice will afford no sanctuary
for freedom of decision and of debate, and the susceptibility of foreign
powers must be consulted in all the departments of Government. Occasions
for intervention in the affairs of other countries are but too numerous
at present, without opening another door to encroachments; and it is no
answer to the argument to say that no complaints will be made but for
reasonable cause, and that of this, the nation complained of being the
judge, no evil can ensue. But this argument concedes the right of
examining the communications in question, which is denied. Allow it and
you will have frivolous as well as grave complaints to answer, and must
not only heal the wounds of a just national pride, but apply a remedy
to those of a morbid susceptibility. To show that my fear of the
progressive nature of these encroachments is not imaginary, I pray leave
to call your excellency's attention to the inclosed report from the
Secretary of State to the President. It is offered for illustration, not
for complaint; I am instructed to make none. Because the Government of
France has taken exceptions to the President's opening message, the
chargé d'affaires of France thinks it his duty to protest against a
special communication, and to point out the particular passages in a
correspondence of an American minister with his own Government to the
publication of which he objects. If the principle I contest is just,
the chargé d'affaires is right. He has done his duty as a vigilant
supervisor of the President's correspondence. If the principle is
admitted, every diplomatic agent at Washington will do the same, and we
shall have twenty censors of the correspondence of the Government and of
the public press. If the principle is correct, every communication which
the President makes in relation to our foreign affairs, either to the
Congress or to the public, ought in prudence to be previously submitted
to these ministers, in order to avoid disputes and troublesome and
humiliating explanations. If the principle be submitted to, neither
dignity nor independence is left to the nation. To submit even to
a discreet exercise of such a privilege would be troublesome and
degrading, and the inevitable abuse of it could not be borne. It must
therefore be resisted at the threshold, and its entrance forbidden
into the sanctuary of domestic consultations. But whatever may be the
principles of other governments, those of the United States are fixed;
the right will never be acknowledged, and any attempt to enforce it
will be repelled by the undivided energy of the nation.
I pray your excellency to observe that my argument does not deny a right
to all foreign powers of taking proper exceptions to the governmental
acts and language of another. It is to their interference in its
consultations, in its proceedings while yet in an inchoate state, that
we object. Should the President do an official executive act affecting
a foreign power, or use exceptionable language in addressing it through
his minister or through theirs; should a law be passed injurious to the
dignity of another nation--in all these and other similar cases a demand
for explanation would be respectfully received, and answered in the
manner that justice and a regard to the dignity of the complaining
nation would require.
After stating these principles, let me add that they have not only been
theoretically adopted, but that they have been practically asserted.
On two former occasions exceptions of the same nature were taken to the
President's message by the Government of France, and in neither did
they produce any other explanation than that derived from the nature
of our Government, and this seems on those occasions to have been
deemed sufficient, for in both cases the objections were virtually
abandoned--one when Messrs. Marshall, Gerry, and Pinckney were refused
to be received, and again in the negotiation between Prince Polignac and
Mr. Rives. In the former case, although the message of the President
was alleged as the cause of the refusal to receive the ministers, yet
without any such explanation their successors were honorably accredited.
In the latter case the allusion in the message to an apprehended
collision was excepted to, but the reference made by Mr. Rives to
the constitutional duties of the President seems to have removed the
objection.
Having demonstrated that the United States can not in any case permit
their Chief Magistrate to be questioned by any foreign government in
relation to his communications with the coordinate branches of his own,
it is scarcely necessary to consider the case of such an explanation
being required as the condition on which the fulfillment of a treaty or
any pecuniary advantage was to depend. The terms of such a proposition
need only be stated to show that it would be not only inadmissible, but
rejected as offensive to the nation to which it might be addressed.
In this case it would be unnecessary as well as inadmissible. France
has already received, by the voluntary act of the President, every
explanation the nicest sense of national honor could desire. That which
could not have been given to a demand, that which can never be given
on the condition now under discussion, a fortunate succession of
circumstances, as I shall proceed to shew, has brought about. Earnestly
desirous of restoring the good understanding between the two nations,
as soon as a dissatisfaction with the President's message was shewn
I suppressed every feeling which the mode of expressing that
dissatisfaction was calculated to produce, and without waiting for
instructions I hastened on my own responsibility to make a communication
to your predecessor in office on the subject. In this, under the reserve
that the President could not be called on for an explanation, I did
in fact give one that I thought would have removed all injurious
impressions.
This is the first of the fortunate circumstances to which I have
alluded--fortunate in being made before any demand implying a right to
require it; fortunate in its containing, without any knowledge of the
precise parts of the message which gave offense, answers to all that
have since come to my knowledge. I can easily conceive that the
communication of which I speak, made, as I expressly stated, without
previous authority from my Government, might not have had the effect
which its matter was intended to produce, but it has since (as I have
now the honor to inform your excellency) received from the President his
full and unqualified approbation; but it is necessary to add that this
was given before he had any intimation of an intention to attach it
as a condition to the payment of the indemnity due by the treaty, given
not only when he was ignorant of any such intent, but when he was
informed by France that she intended to execute the treaty and saw by
the law which was introduced that it was not to be fettered by any such
condition. Thus that is already done by a voluntary act which could not
have been done when required as a right, still less when made, what will
unquestionably in the United States be considered degrading, as a
condition. At this time, sir, I would for no consideration enter into
the details I then did. If I could now so far forget what under present
circumstances would be due to the dignity of my country, I should be
disavowed, and deservedly disavowed, by the President. It is happy,
therefore, I repeat, that the good feeling of my country was evinced in
the manner I have stated at the only time when it could be done with
honor; and though present circumstances would forbid my making the
communication I then did, they do not prevent my referring to it for
the purpose of shewing that it contains, as I have stated it does,
everything that ought to have been satisfactory. Actual circumstances
enable me to do this now. Future events, which I need not explain, may
hereafter render it improper, and it may be nugatory unless accepted as
satisfactory before the occurrence of those events. Let it be examined
with the care which the importance of giving it a true construction
requires. The objections to the message, as far as I can understand,
for they have never been specified, are:
First. That it impeaches the good faith of His Majesty's Government.
Secondly. That it contains a menace of enforcing the performance of the
treaty by reprisals.
On the first head, were I now discussing the terms of the message
itself, it would be easy to shew that it contains no such charge.
The allegation that the stipulations of a treaty have not been complied
with, that engagements made by ministers have not been fulfilled,
couched in respectful terms, can never be deemed offensive, even when
expressly directed to the party whose infractions are complained of, and
consequently can never give cause for a demand of explanation; otherwise
it is evident that no consideration of national injuries could ever take
place. The message, critically examined on this point, contains nothing
more than such an enumeration of the causes of complaint. As to its
terms, the most fastidious disposition can not fasten on one that could
be excepted to. The first refusal and subsequent delay are complained
of, but no unworthy motives for either are charged or insinuated. On the
whole, if I were commissioned to explain and defend this part of the
message, I should say with the conviction of truth that it is impossible
to urge a complaint in milder or more temperate terms; but I am not
so commissioned. I am endeavoring to shew not only that every proper
explanation is given in my letter to M. de Rigny of the 29th of January
last, but that in express terms it declares that the sincerity of His
Majesty's Government in their desire to execute the treaty was not
doubted. Suffer me to draw your excellency's attention to the passages
alluded to. In discussing the nature of M. Sérurier's engagement I say:
"It is clear, therefore, that more was required than the expression of
a desire on the part of His Majesty's ministers to execute the treaty,
_a desire the sincerity of which was never doubted, but which might be
unavailing, as its accomplishment depended on the vote of the
Chambers_."
Again, in speaking of the delay which occurred in the month of December,
I say:
"It is referred to, I presume, in order to shew that it was produced by
a desire on the part of His Majesty's ministers the better to assure the
passage of the law. Of this, sir, I never had a doubt, and immediately
so advised my Government, and informed it, as was the fact, that I
perfectly acquiesced in the delay."
Thus it must be evident, not only that no offensive charge of ill faith
is made in the message, but that, as is expressly stated in the first
extract, full justice was done at Washington to the intentions of the
French Government. While the delay is complained of us a wrong, no
improper motives are attributed to the Government in causing it. Again,
sir, the whole tenor of that part of my letter which relates to the
inexecution of the promise made by M. Sérurier, while it asserts the
construction put upon it by the President to be the true one, and
appeals to facts and circumstances to support that construction, yet it
avoids charging the French Government with any intentional violation, by
attributing their delay to an erroneous construction only; for in the
letter (I again quote literally) I say:
"I have entered into this detail with the object of showing that
although the ministers of the King, under the interpretation they seem
to have given to M. Sérurier's promise, may have considered themselves
at liberty to defer the presentation of the law until the period
which they thought would best secure its success, yet the President,
interpreting that promise differently, feeling that in consequence of it
he had forborne to do what might be strictly called a duty, and seeing
that its performance had not taken place, could not avoid stating the
whole case clearly and distinctly to Congress."
Thus, sir, the President, in stating the acts of which he thought his
country had reason to complain, does not make a single imputation of
improper motive, and to avoid all misconstruction he offers a voluntary
declaration that none such were entertained.
The part of the message which seems to have caused the greatest
sensation in France is that in which, after a statement of the causes
of complaint, it enters into a consideration of the measures to obtain
redress which in similar cases are sanctioned by the laws of nations.
The complaint seems to be that, in a discussion it was impossible to
avoid, of the efficacy and convenience of each, a preference was given
to reprisals, considered as a remedial, not as a hostile, measure,
and this has been construed into a menace. If any explanations were
necessary on this head, they are given in the message itself. It is
there expressly disavowed, and the power and high character of France
are appealed to to shew that it never could be induced by threats to do
what its sense of justice denied. If the measure to which I have more
than once alluded should be resorted to, and the humiliation attending
a compliance with it could be endured; if it were possible under such
circumstances to give an explanation, what more could be required than
that which is contained in the message itself that it was not intended
as a menace? If the measure to which I alluded should be adopted and
submitted to, what would His Majesty's Government require? The disavowal
of any intent to influence the councils of France by threats? They have
it already. It forms a part of the very instrument which caused the
offense, and I will not do them the injustice to think that they could
form the offensive idea of requiring more. The necessity of discussing
the nature of the remedies for the nonexecution of the treaty, the
character and spirit in which it was done, are explained in my letter so
often referred to, and I pray your excellency to consider the concluding
part of it, beginning with the quotation I have last made. But if I
wanted any argument to shew that no explanation of this part of the
message was necessary or could be required, I should find it in the
opinion--certainly a just one--expressed by His Majesty's ministers,
that the recommendation of the President not having been adopted by the
other branches of the Government it was not a national act, and could
not be complained of as such. Nay, in the note presented by M. Sérurier
to the Government at Washington and the measures which it announces (his
recall and the offer of my passports) the Government of His Majesty seem
to have done all that they thought its dignity required, for they at
the same time declare that the law providing for the payment will be
presented, but give no intimation of any previous condition and annex
none to the bill which they present. The account of dignity being thus
declared by this demonstration to be settled, it can not be supposed
that it will again be introduced as a set-off against an acknowledged
pecuniary balance. Before I conclude my observations on this part of the
subject it will be well to inquire in what light exceptions are taken
to this part of the message, whether as a menace generally or to the
particular measure proposed. In the first view, if every measure that
a Government having claims on another declares it must pursue if those
claims are not allowed (whatever may be the terms employed) is a menace,
it is necessary, and not objectionable unless couched in offensive
language; it is a fair declaration of what course the party making it
intends to pursue, and except in cases where pretexts were wanted for
a rupture have rarely been objected to, even when avowedly the act of
the nation, not, as in this case, a proposal made by one branch of its
Government to another. Instances of this are not wanting, but need not
be here enumerated. One, however, ought to be mentioned, because it is
intimately connected with the subject now under discussion. While the
commerce of the United States was suffering under the aggressions of the
two most powerful nations of the world the American Government, in this
sense of the word, menaced them both. It passed a law in express terms
declaring to them that unless they ceased their aggressions America
would hold no intercourse with them; that their ships would be seized if
they ventured into American ports; that the productions of their soil or
industry should be forfeited. Here was an undisguised menace in clear,
unequivocal terms, and of course, according to the argument against
which I contend, neither France nor England could deliberate under its
pressure without dishonor. Yet the Emperor of France, certainly an
unexceptionable judge of what the dignity of his country required, did
deliberate, did accept the condition, did repeal the Berlin and Milan
decrees, did not make any complaint of the act as a threat, though he
called it an injury. Great Britain, too, although at that time on not
very friendly terms with the United States, made no complaint that her
pride was offended. Her minister on the spot even made a declaration
that the obnoxious orders were repealed. It is true he was disavowed,
but the disavowal was accompanied by no objections to the law as a
threat. Should the objection be to the nature of the remedy proposed,
and that the recommendation of reprisals is the offensive part, it would
be easy to show that it stands on the same ground with any other remedy;
that it is not hostile in its nature; that it has been resorted to by
France to procure redress from other powers, and by them against her,
without producing war. But such an argument is not necessary. This is
not the case of a national measure, either of menace or action; it is a
recommendation only of one branch of Government to another, and France
has itself shown that a proposal of this nature could not be noticed as
an offense. In the year 1808 the Senate of the United States annexed to
the bill of nonintercourse a section which not only advised but actually
authorized the President to issue letters of marque and reprisal against
both France and England, if the one did not repeal the Berlin and Milan
decrees and the other did not revoke the orders in council. This clause
was not acceded to by the Representatives, but it was complete as the
act of the Senate; yet neither France nor England complained of it as
an indignity. Both powers had ministers on the spot, and the dignity of
neither seems to have been offended.
If the view I have now taken of the subject be correct; if I have
succeeded in conveying to His Majesty's ministers the conviction
I myself feel that no right exists in any foreign nation to ask
explanations of or even to notice any communications between the
different branches of our Government; that to admit it even in a single
instance would be a dangerous precedent and a derogation from national
dignity, and that in the present instance an explanation that ought to
be satisfactory has been voluntarily given, I have then demonstrated
that any measure founded on such supposed right is not only
inadmissible, but is totally unnecessary, and consequently that His
Majesty's ministers may at once declare that previous explanations given
by the minister of the United States, and subsequently approved by the
President, had satisfied them on the subject of the message.
The motives of my Government during the whole course of this
controversy have been misunderstood or not properly appreciated, and the
question is daily changing its character. A negotiation entered into for
procuring compensation to individuals involved no positive obligation
on their Governments to prosecute it to extremities. A solemn treaty,
ratified by the constitutional organs of the two powers, changed the
private into a public right. The Government acquires by it a perfect
right to insist on its stipulations. All doubts as to their justice seem
now to have been removed, and every objection to the payment of a debt
acknowledged to be just will be severely scrutinized by the impartial
world. What character will be given to a refusal to pay such a debt on
the allegation, whether well or ill founded, of an offense to national
honor it does not become me to say. The French nation are the last that
would ever appreciate national honor by any number of millions it could
withhold as a compensation for an injury offered to it. The United
States, commercial as they are, are the last that would settle such an
account. The proposition I allude to would be unworthy of both, and it
is sincerely to be hoped that it will never be made.
To avoid the possibility of misapprehension, I repeat that this
communication is made with the single view of apprising His Majesty's
Government of the consequences attending a measure which without such
notice they might be inclined to pursue; that although I am not
authorized to state what measures will be taken by the United States,
yet I speak confidently of the principles they have adopted, and have
no doubt they will never be abandoned.
This is the last communication I shall have the honor to make. It is
dictated by a sincere desire to restore a good intelligence, which
seems to be endangered by the very measure intended to consolidate it.
Whatever be the result, the United States may appeal to the world to
bear witness that in the assertion of the rights of their citizens and
the dignity of their Government they have never swerved from the respect
due to themselves and from that which they owe to the Government of
France.
I pray your excellency to receive the assurance of the high
consideration with which I have the honor to be, your most obedient
servant,